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ABSTRACT
AMERICAN MUSLIM MEN AND STIGMA: THE USE OF RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF STIGMA
Jack R. Allen III
May 31, 2017

The experiences of American Muslim men deserve further study because they
are relevant to current civil rights discussions, especially in a social-political climate
that is growing increasingly hostile toward the Islamic world. Despite acknowledging
the significant impact of gender, relatively little research has focused exclusively on
masculine Muslim experiences of stigmatization. This research addresses the
experiences of religiously practicing Muslim men and addresses the following
questions: How do Muslim men experience stigma in their communities? What
experience do these men have with religious institutions? And finally, how do these
experiences with religious institutions inform how these individuals manage stigma?
Using semi-structured qualitative research interviews with men who attend Islamic
religious services in a large mid-western United States city and observation sessions
at the religious services these men attend, this research finds that these men use
stigma management techniques to navigate their social environments and combat
racialized stigmatization.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The United States is becoming an increasingly hostile place for Muslims and
those perceived to be Muslim following military involvement in the Middle East and
international acts of terror attributed to groups such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Several government and private agencies, such as the American
Civil Liberties Union, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, report that hate crimes committed against those perceived to
be Muslim have increased 1,700% since 9/11 (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009: 48). The
Southern Poverty Law Center (2012) reported a 50% increase in hate crimes against
Muslims in 2012; this increase is likely tied to hateful rhetoric from politicians and
activists. Given this increase in the rate of hate crimes, discussions that center on the
experiences of Muslim Americans have become the forefront of civil rights
discussions. This study analyzes how Muslim men experience and manage antiIslamic hostility. Greater understanding of these experiences can inform public policy
that ought to protect these individuals amid national and international terror.
Islam is a major world religion, and its constituents come from an incredibly
diverse array of nationalities. However, American scholarship generally discusses the
experiences of Arab Americans and religiously practicing Muslims in terms of
“racialization” (Garner and Selod 2015; Jaffe-Walter 2016; Rana 2011; Razack 2008;
Selod 2014). Omi and Winant (2015) define racialization in terms of “the extension
of racial meaning to a previously unclassified relationship, social practice, or group”
(111). In the case of Muslim men, their religious identity and practice is transformed
1

into a racial designation. Rana (2011) builds on this argument stating that, “the
Muslim is understood not only as a totalized biological body, but also as a cultural
and social entity constructed within a number of discursive regimes, including those
of terrorism, fundamentalism, patriarchy, sexism, and labor migration” (26). Scholars
point to religious signifiers and practices (Selod 2014) as well as ques of foreignness
(Brown et. al. 2013) as markers of this newly conflated racial category. Muslim
religious signifiers include but are not limited to the hijab, beards, traditional clothing
(primarily the thobe – a long robe worn by Muslim men) names, and phenotypes such
as skin tone (Brown et. al. 2013; Council on American-Islamic Relations 2007: 20;
Selod 2014). Popular discussions surrounding the mistreatment and hateful rhetoric
that surrounds Muslims uses the term Islamophobia. Islamophobia is a relatively
young term and can be simply used to describe racism against Muslims (Garner and
Selod 2015; Rana 2011).
The use of the word “Muslim” becomes confusing because it could refer to a
religious or racial designation. Meer (2008) argues that racially or religiously
classified Muslims can be viewed as a “quasi-ethnic sociological formation” (66).
This distinction is “quasi-ethnic” because ethnic and religious identities “intersect and
are rarely clearly demarcated” (Meer 2008: 66). Individuals can personally identify as
Muslims because they observe the religious practices of Islam, they were born into a
religiously practicing family, or because they belong to ethnic groups who have been
associated with the Islamic faith. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and can
be difficult to differentiate even for individuals who self-identify as Muslims. This
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research analyzes Islamophobia against religiously practicing Muslims through a
racial lens.
In addition to racialization, this study explores the experiences of Muslim
American men in terms of stigma. Using stigma to analyze the experiences of Muslim
men is not in contradiction to previous studies’ assertion that Muslim men carry a
racialized identity. Rather, this study seeks to understand how Muslim men manage
and live with stigmatizing racial and religious identities. Goffman (1963) defines
stigma as “an attribute which is deeply discrediting within a particular social
interaction” (3). Using this definition, practicing Muslims can be understood to carry
stigma related to their racial and religious identities. This stigma associates the
practice of Islam with terrorism and casts Muslim men as threats. In addition to
general Muslim stigma, literature suggests that men experience a gendered stigma as
sexists (Razack 2008: 16). Despite these theoretical positions, relatively little research
exclusively addresses the stigma experiences of Muslim men. Thus, in exploring the
experiences of men, the current study seeks to contribute to this research gap.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this study is to investigate the following research questions:
How do Muslim men experience stigma in their communities? What experience do
these men have with religious institutions? And finally, how do these experiences
with religious institutions inform how these individuals come to manage stigma? This
investigation is relevant to current discussions which center around the rights and
mistreatment of individuals who are perceived to be Muslim.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a growing body of research on the experiences of Muslim Americans
in the social sciences. This review explores the literature using several questions.
First, the review will begin by discussing the history of Muslim experience in the
United States using 9/11 as the turning point: What experiences did Muslims have
before 9/11? And what experiences did they have after 9/11? Then this review will
discuss literature on specific gendered Muslim experiences of stigma: Do the
experiences of men and women differ? The literature review will then focus on how
stigma management has been discussed in the current body of research. And finally,
the review will discuss the importance of religious structures for Muslims as a
stigmatized group.
MUSLIM STIGMA IN HISTORY
Though there has been a resurgence in Islamophobia and hate crimes against
Muslims in the 21st century, there is a consensus among scholars that the
mistreatment of Muslims is not new. Akram and Johnson (2002: 302) claim, “the
post-September 11 targeting of Muslims and Arabs is simply the latest chapter in
history.” In many ways, religious designations of superior and inferior people predate
the division of people based on race (Rana 2011; Selod 2016). The socially
constructed notion that Muslims are unusually violent dates as far back as the 9th
century in Europe (Mastnak 2010; Selod 2016: 63). In United States history, “Islam
represented a liberatory identification for African Americans; however, this presented
a threat to white Christian supremacy that was then used to further racialize
4

immigrant and Black Muslims” (Rana 2011: 28). The racialization of the Muslim
other saw a resurgence after the fall of the Soviet Union. Current scholarship argues
that Islam has been crafted as the new conceptual opponent of Western Democracies
after the fall of Communism (Mastnak 2010; Rana 2011; Werbner 2005). In current
time, Muslim’s racialized identities come to take on nationalist meanings and stand in
contradiction to a normative White Christian America and the United States nationstate. The framing of Muslims as anti-American contributes to the experiences of
religiously practicing Muslim men in modern time.
POST-9/11 MUSLIM EXPERIENCES
The experiences of Muslims in the United States during the most recent
century are like the experiences of other disenfranchised racial groups. These
experiences include the threat of hate crimes, negative media, and legally mandated
discrimination (Akram and Johnson 2002: 304). Most scholarship views 9/11 as one
of the most pivotal points in modern history. Singh (2002: 3) states:
Over the past twenty years backlash hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in
the United States have become predictable, triggered by conflict in the Middle
East and acts of terrorism associated with Arabs or Muslims. The hate crimes
that followed the September 11 attacks nonetheless were unique in their
severity and extent.
9/11 is understood as an international terrorist attack attributed to al-Qaeda
that occurred on September 11, 2001. Conventional narratives state that four
commercial airliners were hijacked by al-Qaeda operatives. Two of these airliners
were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City and a third struck the
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The fourth plane crashed into a field outside of
Pennsylvania. Muslims received heightened mistreatment after these events because
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9/11 was attributed to Islamic extremism. For example, Cainkar (2002) describes the
immediate aftermath from these attacks in Chicago:
In Chicago, more than 100 hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims, as well as
persons mistaken for them, were reported to the Chicago Commission on
Human Relations by the end of December 2001. On September 12, the largest
predominantly Arab mosque in the Chicago metropolitan area was surrounded
by a mob of hundreds of angry whites, some shouting ‘kill the Arabs,’ some
wielding weapons. … An Assyrian church on the north side and an Arab
community organization on the southwest side were damaged by arson in the
late fall. The rebuilt community center was again vandalized in March 2002.
In the months immediately following September, Muslim women in Chicago
repeatedly reported having their head scarves yanked off or being spit at in the
street (23).
While the Council on American-Islamic relations (CAIR) (2004:11) recorded
a steady increase in reports of discrimination prior to 2001, threats against Muslims
have increased after 9/11. Reported physical violence against Muslims increased from
42 reported incidents to 93 between 2002 and 2003 (Council on American-Islamic
Relations 2004: 10). Reported hate crimes increased from 153 to 167 between 2005
and 2006 (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2007: 9). In fact, the number of
hate crimes against Muslims reported increased each year after 9/11 until 2007, when
it began a two-year decline until the last public human rights report by CAIR. Prior to
9/11, hate-groups targeted Muslim and Arab Americans. Organizations such as the
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rit have illegally monitored thousands of Arab
Americans and organizations for much of the twentieth century (Akram and Johnson
2002: 304). The Southern Poverty Law Center (2017) reports and increase in the
number of anti-Muslim hate groups since 9/11. This number increased the most
between 2015 and 2016, jumping from 34 to 101.
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Prejudice against Muslims has been cultivated by popular media images
depicting Muslims in stereotypical roles. American media and cinematography is
historically linked to stereotyping of racial groups (Hazell and Clarke 2008). Muslims
have been frequently portrayed in film as misogynistic, fundamentalists, terrorists,
and violent enemies to democracy (Rana 2011: 79). Akram and Johnson (2002) argue
that this stereotyping goes largely unnoticed because these views are consistent with
general attitudes in United States society.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States and other Western Powers passed
legislation directed at policing Arabs and Muslims under the guise of national
security (Werbner 2005). The policing of Muslim bodies preceded the 9/11 attacks.
The United States has systematically profiled Arabs and Muslims in national airports
since 1996 (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2002: 4). However, the treatment
of American Muslims as a threat has surged and gained political support following
Islamic terror. Perhaps the most notable legislation after 9/11 is the Patriot Act, which
the United States in direct response to those attacks. This act allows federal agents to
issue National Security Letters without approval from a judge. These letters are used
to authorize the surveillance of American citizens determined to be a threat to
national security. Even if in suspected terrorists are found to be innocent, data
collected is not required to be destroyed (American Civil Liberties Union). Some
scholars suggest that the government is the primary source of discrimination against
Muslims in the United States (Cainkar 2002: 23). The Council on American-Islamic
Relations reported in April of 2002 that over 60,000 individuals experienced
discrimination from the United States government by means of “interrogation, raids,
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arrests, detentions, and institutional closures” (Council on American-Islamic
Relations 2002; Cainkar 2002: 23).
The 2016 presidential debates provide a unique setting to analyze how the
Islamic faith is becoming increasingly politicized (Hussain and Bagguley 2012; Read
2015; Shyrock 2010: 8). During the 2016 Presidential campaign, major political
leaders appealed to a fear of “Radical Islamic Terror” in the voting populous. When
asked what they planned to do about Islamophobia and Muslim Americans being
labeled as a threat to national security during the second presidential debate, both
Democratic nominee Hilary Clinton and Republican nominee Donald Trump made
the claim that American Muslims needed to be the United States’ “eyes and ears”
when it comes to terrorist activity (New York Times 2016). These statements imply
that religious Muslims have heightened associations with terrorist activity. AntiIslamic rhetoric was especially central to the campaign of President Donald J. Trump.
Though in many ways his proposed political agenda has lightened in intensity, one of
his first executive orders in office was a temporary halt on immigration from many
majority Muslim countries, followed by “extreme vetting” of all refugees and
immigrants from these countries (BBC 2017; White House 2017).
GENDER AND MUSLIM STIGMA
Scholars have recognized gender as a central variable that contributes to the
experience of stigma. Razack (2008) discusses the importance of gender to the
stigmatization of Muslims:
Gender is crucial to the confinement of Muslims to the pre-modern as postcolonial scholarship has long shown. Considered irredeemably fanatical,
irrational, and thus dangerous, Muslim men are also marked as deeply
misogynist patriarchs who have not progressed into the age of gender equality,
8

and who indeed cannot. For the West, Muslim women are the markers of their
communities’ place in modernity (16).
This analysis does not mean that Muslim women do not experience stigmatization.
Scholarship has documented instances of women being discriminated against and
mistreated by anti-Islamic perpetrators (Cainkar 2002; Selod 2014). This statement
means that men face a double stigma. According to Razack (2008), Muslim men are
viewed as opponents to western democracy, social progress, and have become
symbolic of a rigid gender oppressing regime (16).
Despite the acknowledgement that gender is central to the experience of antiIslamic stigma, there is a dearth of masculine experiences with post-terror backlash
and discrimination in research literature. This research seeks to develop and
contribute to this gap. Scholarship has focused on Muslim women’s experiences with
discrimination. This focus is likely in response to an increase in hate crimes
committed against Muslim women who identified as Muslim by perpetrators because
of the religious practice of wearing the hijab (Selod 2014; Ahmed 2011). For
instance, Selod (2014) discusses an American fascination with the hijab, noting “the
hijab does not just signify foreignness; it represents an ambiguously defined
geographic part of the world that is antagonistic to democracy and American values:
the Muslim world” (8). One example of stigmatization is in the experiences of even
American born Muslim women being told to “go back to” the countries that they
came from (Council on American-Islamic Relations 1998: 4). The cues of foreignness
that men possess are not as explicit as the hijab. Thus, it can be presumed that Muslim
men experience stigma and discrimination differently than Muslim women.
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While scarce, there are some studies that focus on the experiences of
American Muslim men as they compare to the experiences of women. In a
questionnaire study of 102 Muslim men and women, Abu-Ras and Suarez (2009)
report likely differences in the types of discrimination that men and women face as
well as differences in the likelihood that gendered individuals would experience
symptoms of post-traumatic stress. Women were more likely to report being the
victims of hate crimes (86.3%, n = 44) than men (54.9%, n = 28) (Abu-Ras and
Suarez 2009: 54), while men were more likely to report the loss of a job as a form of
discrimination (10.8%, n = 10) than women (3.9%, n = 4) (Abu-Ras and Suarez,
2009: 54). With respect to symptoms of post-traumatic stress, men scored higher in
anger/irritability, hopelessness, guilt or shame, feelings of numbness, problems with
concentration and problems with decision making (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009: 56).
However, women scored higher in difficulty falling or staying asleep, feelings of
sadness or tearful, feelings of anxiety, use of drugs (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009: 56).
Similarly, Selod (2016) retroactively reviews responses from a larger study of the
experiences of both men and women in the post-9/11 America. She argues, “Muslim
American men are criminalized as potential terrorists and are not afforded the
protections of citizenship because of the racialization of their religious identity”
(Selod 2016: 63). These studies suggest that men and women are stigmatized
differently. While Muslim men may be less visible than Muslim women, they
experience a criminalization and stigmatization that is unique to their gender
identities.
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NEGOTIATING STIGMATIZED RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES
Studies on Muslim American experiences after 9/11 demonstrate that
individuals who are perceived to be Muslim experience mistreatment and stigma due
to conflated religious and racial identification. Individuals also undertake explicit
action to counteract this mistreatment. Using the findings of a survey and focus group
based research study on Muslim American adolescents in New York, Sirin and Fine
(2007: 151) assert that adolescents who are both Muslim and American experience
internal conflict, whereby they must reconcile their American identities with their
Muslim identities. This need for reconciliation is the result of popular discussions that
position Muslims as oppositional to the United States. In an ethnographic study of a
mosque in a major American city, O’Brien (2011) reported instances of Muslim
American youth rehearsing strategies for stigma management. These rehearsals
included literally acting out or talking through real or hypothetical scenarios where
discrimination occurred in a safe location. O’Brien (2011) observed that rehearsals
allow adolescents to “openly discuss strategies, and express emotions” in ways that
they are unable to when facing discrimination (296). In a study where 48 Muslim
Americans were interviewed, Selod (2014) records incidences of Muslim women
feeling pressured to discontinue religious practices, specifically wearing a hijab, to
eliminate potential threats of stigma and discrimination. In the American context,
Muslim Americans are caught in the cross-fire of racialization and stigmatization, but
religious Muslims are the target of discrimination and mistreatment.
Religious identity is especially important in the current study because all of
the participants self-identify as practicing Muslims. Furthermore, this research
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focuses on religious institutions and their role in socializing the stigma management
strategies of religiously practicing Muslim men. O’Brien (2011) observed Muslim
American adolescents using a mosque as a setting for backstage stigma management
rehearsals. Thus, religious identity and communities can both be important and
intersecting factors regarding the experience and management of stigma. O’Brien
(2011) discussed two types of stigma management rehearsals: “direct preparation
stigma rehearsals,” and “deep education stigma rehearsals.” Direct preparation stigma
rehearsals involved literally acting out and practicing responses to stigmatizing
scenarios in the mosque. For the deep education stigma rehearsals, leaders most often
provided “religious reasoning” for the rehearsed response (O’Brien 2011: 301). Thus,
the response to stigma can be directly tied to religious teaching. This project will
expand on this research by examining how these religious settings might be central to
the management of stigma among adult men.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study expands on the current body of research by incorporating
theoretical understandings of stigma management and intersectionality to the
racialization of Muslim men. Men in this study experience stigma and use strategies
discussed by stigma management literature. Men also discussed the ways that
attributes that are central to their racial, religious, and gendered identities likely
contribute to their experiences as Muslim men. This section will discuss the
theoretical concepts that are used to understand these experiences.
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Stigma Management
Goffman (1963) discusses three distinct forms of stigma. These are: physical
deformities; blemishes of individual character; and a stigma of race, nationality or
religion (4).” The stigmatization that American Muslims face exists in an overlap of
“race, nationality and religion”; and because of narratives of recent history, the
“blemishes of personal character” category. O’Brien (2011) identifies stigma and
stigma management as a key theoretical framework for the study of the experiences
of Muslim Americans (295).
The experience of stigma forces individuals who hold these identities into a
heightened double-consciousness. Individuals facing stigma must learn to manage
this perceived identity without forfeiting the realities of their self-identification.
Stigma management is defined as “the attempt by persons with stigmatized social
identities to approach interpersonal interactions in ways aimed at minimizing the
social costs of carrying these identities” (O’Brien 2011: 292). According to Modified
Labeling Theory, stigma has a powerful influence on the identity development of
stigmatized individuals (Link et. al. 1989: 401). Stigma can be managed by
withdrawing from relationships with others, attempting to hide one’s stigmatizing
status, and educating others to avoid the negative consequences of one’s stigma
(Schroeder and Mowen 2014: 459). This study focuses on the ways that Muslim men
engage these strategies in managing their stigmatized racial identities.
The prominence or visibility of social information that connects individuals to
a stigmatizing category has significant impact on experiences of stigma or abilities to
manage stigma (Goffman 1963: 49). Decisions regarding concealing and revealing

13

stigmatizing identities are dynamic. Poindexter and Shippy (2010) state: “decisions
about to whom, how, and when to disclose occur not as discrete events or simple
decisions, but as ongoing, reoccurring, and complex decisions that people revisit and
revise” (368). These decisions are related to characteristics or attributes which may or
may not be out of control of social actors. Goffman (1963) coined the term stigma
symbol to refer to: “signs which are especially effective in drawing attention to a
debasing identity discrepancy, breaking up what would otherwise be a coherent
overall picture, with a consequent reduction in our valuation of the individual” (44).
Poindexter and Shippy (2010) found that stigmatized individuals experienced what
they called “partial disclosure,” (370) where participants did not have full control
over whether others identified them as belonging to a stigmatizing category. Partial
disclosure is relevant to the stigmatization of Muslim men because several variables
or stigma symbols contribute to individuals experience of and options for managing
stigma. Potential stigma symbols include: Phenotype, nationality of origin, racial
categorization, names, religious practice, dress, and social environment.
According to Goffman (1963), complete social withdrawal is not possible for
an individual who must still function in society (73). Rather than discussing complete
social withdrawal as a possibility, Goffman (1963) focuses on three types of social
environments that stigmatized individuals must negotiate with their stigmatized
identities (81). These include: 1) “out-of-bounds” places, where the threat of
revealing or presenting stigma is too great for social functioning; 2) “civil” places,
where stigmatized individuals can interact with dominant group members freely and
are able to present stigma without facing scrutiny; and 3) “back” places, where
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stigmatized individuals can interact with other in-group stigmatized members outside
of the view of dominant group members (81). Handling a stigmatized identity within
a social space requires an understanding of Goffman’s three spaces. Religiously
practicing Muslim men’s social environments are likely shaped by their religious and
other intersecting identities. Therefore, social withdrawal may or may not require
active effort on their behalf.
“Passing” is relevant to discussions of concealing stigmatizing status
(Goffman 1963: 73; Park 2002: 32). The possession, or lack, of the variables listed
above contribute to differing abilities of stigma possessing individuals to pass as
normative, dominant group members. Muslim men, who do not possess outwardly
visible symbols of their Muslim identity, may be able to pass as non-Muslim to avoid
a potentially stigmatizing identity. For example, dominant group members may not
suspect a man who others would classify as white or black rather than Arab and who
does not wear traditional religious garb or sport a long beard to be Muslim. Passing
can involve active efforts by stigmatized individuals to deflect their stigmatizing
identity. Goffman (1963) coins the term disidentifiers to refer to symbols that are
employed to disrupt a coherent identity, but in a positive direction (44). An example
that will be discussed in this study is the use of a westernized nickname to conceal
association with Muslim identities. Individuals who are unable or unwilling to pass
have more limited options for managing stigma.
Strategies for stigma management that seek to educate others focus on
eliminating negative associations surrounding a particular attribute. In their work on
Stigma and HIV, Poindexter and Shippy (2010) discuss educational stigma managing
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strategies in terms of stigma resistance (376). They argue that individuals who
employ stigma resistance as a coping strategy move beyond merely managing their
stigma.” “They represent examples of assertive, resilient choices to disclose”
(Poindexter and Shippy 2010: 377). Goffman (1963) suggests that forms of stigma
management that do not conceal identity can be described as mature (102). If
religious Muslim identity is central to how individuals view themselves, educational
techniques could become central strategies for managing stigma.
Intersectionality
Intersectional research seeks to address limitations in research that fails to
discuss how differing identities contribute to lived experiences. McCall (2005)
discusses the origins of intersectionality:
“Interest in intersectionality arose out of a critique of gender-based and racebased research for failing to account for lived experience at neglected points
of intersection—ones that tended to reﬂect multiple subordinate locations as
opposed to dominant or mixed locations” (1780).
This research uses paradigms of intersectionality to understand the
experiences of American Muslim men. Crenshaw (1991) discusses the experiences of
black women using three distinct types of intersectionality. These are: structural
intersectionality, political intersectionality, and representational intersectionality.
Again, using this theory to discuss the experiences of women of color, Crenshaw
(1991) first defines structural intersectionality as “the ways in which the location of
women of color at the intersection of race and gender makes their actual experience
of domestic violence, rape, and remedial reform qualitatively different than that of
white women” (1245). Second, “Political intersectionality highlights the fact that
women of color are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently
16

pursue conflicting political agendas” (Crenshaw 1991: 1252). Finally, Crenshaw
defines representational intersectionality as “the cultural construction of women of
color” (Crenshaw 1991: 1245). These definitions are relevant to discussions of
Muslim men’s experiences in the post 9/11 United states because, like women of
color, their location at the intersection of race, religion, and gender could cause them
to have qualitatively different experiences than Muslim men of different races or
ethnicities and Muslim women. Furthermore, Muslim men could have political
interests that differ from those of Muslim women because they are casted as
opponents of both United States interests and Muslim women. Finally, Muslim men
could be disempowered by their cultural representations as sexists and terrorist
threats.
Most of the intersectional research that explores the experiences of Muslims
in the post 9/11 era focuses on Muslim women (Aziz 2012; Essers and Benschop
2009; Mirza 2013). For example, Mirza (2013) uses “the black feminist framework of
‘embodied intersectionality’” to analyze the experiences of three Muslim women
living in Britain (5). In this, she focused on how the “intersectionality of race, gender,
and religion” was experienced by those three women. The current study seeks to
expand the intersectional research paradigm to discuss the stigmatization of Muslim
American men and how the intersections of race, ethnicity, gender, and visibility
influence experiences.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To address my research questions, I used a mixed methods-qualitative
research approach, focusing on the experiences of congregants from four different
Islamic religious centers in a large Mid-western city, that we will call “Greensburg”
(The actual city has been concealed to protect the identities of research participants
and organizations). The decision to study Greensburg is based primarily convenience
and my ability to access contacts and religious centers. However, there are theoretical
justifications for using this city a setting for study. Greensburg is the largest
metropolitan area in its state. Thus, it can logically be inferred that the city contains
not only the largest amount of practicing Muslims in the State, but the largest number
of religious institutions as well. Furthermore, many current studies of Muslim
populations have taken place in the state of Michigan or other much larger cities.
While this is justified due to a large Muslim population, it may not accurately
represent the experiences of Muslims in other geographic areas of the United States
or in more isolated social environments. Greensburg also presents a unique setting for
researching the experiences of American Muslims. The city launched a campaign in
2011 that included partnerships with interfaith organizations working toward
collective peace and understanding. The city prides itself in its response to the local
Islamic community and in its treatment of immigrants and refugees. When a mosque
in Greensburg was defaced in 2015, the community banded together to clean the
vandalized mosque. In 2017, the mayor of Greensburg organized a rally in response
to President Donald Trump’s first executive order to halt immigration and refugee
resettlement. The rally was intended to display solidarity with the city’s immigrant
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community. Thus, Greensburg appears to be a relatively hospitable environment for
Muslim Americans.
RESEARCH SITES
All interviews and observation sessions are from four religious institutions in
the city Greensburg. To further protect the identities of the individuals that attend
these locations, these institutions will be referred to as “Sites.” Sites were selected
primarily because of the accessibility and convenience that they offered. Secondarily,
sites were selected based on theoretical justifications and suggestions from Muslim
contacts in the field.
Site 1 was selected because I have a previously existing relationship with the
Imam at this center from a pilot study and general inquiry. I previously attended
Ramadan meals at this site and play basketball with some of the college students who
attend here. Thus, overtime, I have been able to develop some report with its
members. Site 1 is in Greensburg’s downtown area. This site was described as a
“missionary venture” in one interview and services largely first-generation
immigrants and refugees. However, due to its proximity to university campuses,
many college students attend its Friday afternoon services.
Site 2 was selected because I attended an “open house” event after being
invited by a friend prior to this study. This event was designed to invite non-Muslims
to the mosque to learn about Islam. During this encounter, informants suggested that
congregants would be very open to discussing their experiences with researchers. Site
2 is a large mosque in eastern Greensburg, which is typically associated with
heightened socio-economic status. Many of its regular congregants live in a

19

residential area directly beside the religious institution. This mosque services a
largely a middle to upper-middle class population.
Site 3 was selected per the recommendation of an informant. This informant
suggested that site 3 had the best English translation of services in Greensburg. The
importance of this is discussed later in the methods section. Site 3 is a large mosque
located on the Eastern side of the city. The congregants of this mosque appear to be
the highest educated and have the highest socioeconomic status of any of the sites
observed in Greensburg.
Site 4 was also selected for the English translation of its services. Site 4 is a
large mosque located on the South end of Greenburg’s downtown. Per some
interviews, this site services Muslims of lower socioeconomic status’s than the other
three mosques in this study. This mosque appears to have a high immigrant
population with many more people than other sites who would be racially identified
as black.
INTERVIEWING
As previously stated, this is a qualitative mixed methods research study. I use
a combination of semi-structured interviewing and participant observation sessions
for collecting data. Semi-structured interviews of religious Muslim men is my
primary source of data, while I additionally observed the religious services that
participants attend as a secondary form of data collection. This project is based on
similar research that has used these methods to understand the experiences of
Muslims (Jaffe-Walter 2016; O’Brien 2011; Selod 2014). Furthermore, interviewing
is appropriate because the experience of stigma can be personally sensitive (Gillman
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2004: 15), complex and can require “teasing out” (Gillham 2004: 16). Semistructured interviewing is used so that as narratives and trends are revealed during
data collection, questions can be adapted to inquire more deeply into the experiences
of the study participants (Charmaz 2012: 26). The current study consists of fifteen
individual interviews split among three of the Islamic centers in Greensburg (Five
each). I originally aimed to interview five participants from site 4, but time
constraints and difficulty acquiring interviews from this site prevented that.
Regardless, this number of interviews is methodologically appropriate because the
aim of qualitative research is to develop categories for deep understanding rather than
develop generalizable results (Gillham 2004: 11). Interviews focused on: 1) the
experience of mistreatment or stigma; 2) how participants generally responded to said
mistreatment or stigma; and 3) the role of religious institutions in how participants
understood and responded to mistreatment and stigma. These interviews were
approximately an hour in duration. All interviews were recorded and transcribed
except for one participant from site 2 who did not wish to be recorded. To address
this interview, I took physical notes during the interview and immediately after the
interview recorded my own account of the interview in my car. An interview guide is
presented in Appendix B. After collection and transcription, interview and observation
data were coded using Atlas-Ti. Atlas-Ti is a program commonly used in qualitative
research to analyze data and develop findings. Qualitative methodology may require
data to be coded multiple times. This research uses three stages of coding. These three
coding run-throughs included 1) line by line coding (Charmaz 2012: 51) to help me
generate further research questions to address trends in the data, 2) focused coding
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(Charmaz 2012: 57) where I aggregated codes to create groups for analysis, and 3)
theoretical coding (Charmaz 2012: 63) where I connected coding groups to piece
together a coherent research narrative.
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
Participant observation is a secondary method of analysis in this study. For
participant observation sessions, I attended ten Friday Jumu’ah services, which are
the primary weekly religious services for Muslim men. The ten services were split
evenly (5 each) at sites 3 and 4, which were reported to have the most clearly English
translated services. These observations focus on what speakers at religious services
say and how speakers instruct Muslim men. According to Jorgensen (1989),
participant observation can be beneficial in research work when: “1) little is known
about the phenomenon; 2) there are significant differences between the views of
insiders as opposed to outsiders; and 3) the phenomenon is somehow obscured from
the view of outsiders” (13). The religious services of Muslim men, as it pertains to the
management of stigma, fulfills these qualifications. Furthermore, “findings of
participant observation research are appropriate for critically examining theories and
other claims to knowledge” (Jorgensen 1989: 13). Observing the religious services
that American Muslim men attend verifies the role of religious institutions in the
management of group stigma. Reflections and observations from the session were
audio recorded after each service and later transcribed for further analysis.
SAMPLING
Practicing Muslim men are the sample for this study because they self-identify
as Muslim. This sampling decision simplifies the sampling process by moving the
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responsibility of discerning the identities of individuals from subjectively determined
assignments by the researcher to objective religious self-identification by participants.
As discussed previously, scholars have wrestled over just what the operative term
“Muslim” refers to (Meer 2008). This study analyzes the experiences of Muslim men
that I define as religiously practicing. In the current study, religiously practicing
merely refers to men who attend religious services at mosques, as this is where
interviews have been acquired. Focusing on the religious identities of Muslims allows
for intersectional analysis across lines of ethnicity and nationality. Furthermore, this
research analyzes how religious communities can contribute to the management of
stigma by focusing on religiously practicing Muslims.
Men are the sample population for study primarily in order to address gaps in
the research literature. Additionally, the researcher’s identity as a male allows him to
gain entre to religious services that men attend where observations and contacts were
made. Men sampled were required to have lived in the United States for at least five
years. This requirement ensures that the men studied have possible American
experiences to reflect on and prevents many linguistic barriers that may arise. These
men were also required to be at least eighteen years of age.
Sampling procedures varied between research sites in this study. The
interviews were procured by a combination of availability, purposive, and snowball
sampling (Charmaz 2012: 100; Faugier and Sargeant 1997), contingent on participant
availability and receptivity in the field. Interviews from this site 1 were procured
exclusively by availability sampling. I attended religious services and talked briefly
about my research interests. If the men I spoke to were willing I asked for their phone
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number and contacted them at a later time to set up an interview at a location and
time of their choice.
Interviews from site 2 were almost exclusively procured by snowball
sampling. After attending a Tuesday night prayer services, I revealed my identity as a
researcher to two men who then directed me to a gatekeeper. This gatekeeper asked
several questions about my research and was willing to provide me with contacts who
were willing to be interviewed. Faugier and Sargeant (1997) argue that non- random
sampling methods, such as availability and snowball sampling, “are particularly
effective in locating members of special populations where the focus of the study is
on a sensitive issue” (792). One additional interview was theoretically sampled, to
address the experiences of white convert Muslims.
Interviews from site 3 were procured through availability sampling. I attended
Friday Jumu’ah services for participant observation sessions. After the service, I
approached men and revealed my research identity. If men were receptive to this, I
requested phone numbers and contacted them later to set up an interview at a time a
place of their choosing. I interviewed one black converted Muslim additionally, for
theoretical purposes. Theoretical sampling is purposive and can help to distinguish
research categories more fully (Charmaz 2012: 100).
PARTICIPANT OVERVIEW
Eight of the fifteen participants interviewed had immigrated to the United
States. These eight men have been living in the States anywhere from seven to fiftythree years with a median of twenty years. Three of the Fifteen participants
interviewed were first generation Americans. The remaining four interviewees are
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American born Muslims, three of which converted to Islam. These three converts
have been religious Muslims for ten, eighteen, and twenty-four years, respectively.
Interview participants came from ten nationalities. These participants originate from
Africa, America, Egypt, Iraq, India, Libya, Somalia, Palestine, Pakistan, Turkey, and
Yemen. Racial designation was somewhat ambiguous in this study. Participants often
had difficulty racially classifying themselves. This ambiguity will be discussed later
in findings. Racial categories listed included: “American”, African American,
Middle-eastern, Mixed, and White. Interview participants ranged in age from
eighteen to eighty-one years with a median age of thirty-six. These men came from a
variety of occupations, including: Accounting professors, Bilingual Instructors
(Public School), Cardiologists, Computer Engineers, Data Administrators (Census),
Imams, Islamic School Teachers, Medical Scribes, Medical Researchers, Non-Profit
Work, Small Business Owners, Software Engineers, and Students.
For this study, religious practice is primarily measured in terms of the number
of religious services that people attend on a regular basis. Interview participants
ranged from rarely attending religious services or only attending one service per week
to attending five religious services each day seven days per week. Within this range,
most participants reported attending public services somewhere between 4 times per
week or once a day (seven times per week). A chart of pertinent demographic
information on research participants is provided in Table 1.
Table 1
Pseudonym
Alex

Age
(years)
23

Nationality
of Origin
White
American

Religious
Practice
“Not
often”
25

Years in U.S
(Immigrants)

Years Muslim
(Converts)
10

Kareem

42

African
American
Iraqi American

Red

26

Abraham

81

Indian

Zain

27

Pakistani

Aidan

49

Pakistani

Pasha

23

Libyan

Johnny

18

Somali

Mostafa

23

Palestinian

Hamza

36

Indian

Mohamad

65

Iraqi

Hassan

38

Indian

Ali

37

Omar
Samir

45
36

African
American
Yemeni
Egyptian

Once
weekly
Once
weekly –
Once
daily
Twice
Weekly
2–3
times
weekly
4 times
weekly
4 -10
times
weekly
1–2
times
daily
Once or
more
daily
3 times
daily
5 times
daily
5 times
daily
5 times
daily
…
…

24

53

45

10
10
7
30
30
18
7

PARTICIPANT NAMING
In the interest of protecting the identities of the men in this study, participants
either selected or were assigned pseudonyms. Study participants were given the
opportunity to select pseudonyms for themselves. Despite this opportunity, only six
interviewees elected to do so. Alex, Johnny, Omar, Pasha, Red, and Zain were all
selected by the men in this study. Other names were assigned based on themes from
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interviews, for example: Ali mentioned that Muhammad Ali was a hero and Abraham
discussed Abrahamic religions extensively. I selected other pseudonyms from other
common religious Muslim names. Transcriptions from interviews, including names
were member checked with the exception of some interviewees, who I was unable to
make contact with after interviews.
LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH
This research is limited on account of the researcher’s identity and
methodology. First, the identities that I, as a researcher hold, can be seen as
limitations to the research conducted in this project. I am a White non-Muslim male.
During the interview process many, participants also assumed the researcher to
possess a Christian identity, though this identity was not explicitly presented during
the research process. These identities and perceptions prevented me from gaining true
insider status, and as I discuss in the findings section, positioned me as a dominant
group member against subordinate group members. Though I did not perceive it in
the field, men may have held back in interviews, given the current political climate of
the United States. Furthermore, I was turned down by potential participants who did
not want to or were unable to meet to discuss their experiences in the United States.
This could have been related to my presumed affiliation with dominant groups.
Because of the above-mentioned limitations, I cannot speak on behalf of the
experiences of Muslims in the United States. However, I apply social theory to the
analysis of the experiences of the Muslim American men in this study. Furthermore,
my identity as a dominant group member gives me opportunity to observe stigma
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management as an outsider, and grants me to ask question that might otherwise be
considered common sense to ingroup members.
Second, the methodology employed during the research process presents its
own limitations. My sample is considered small because I only interviewed fifteen
men and only observed at ten religious services. Furthermore, my sampling
procedures are non-random. Small scale qualitative research methods are useful for
collecting rich data from a smaller population. Findings from these methods cannot
be generalized to larger populations of Muslims. Rather, this research develops
categories that can be utilized to understand and interpret the experiences of
religiously practicing Muslim American men. Thus, another aim of this study is to
offer transferability of results.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
This discussion of research findings is divided into 3 large sections: Being
Muslim Men in the United States, Strategies for Stigma Management, and Religious
Structures. These sections are further subdivided based on themes from the research
data. The section called Being Muslim Men in the United States discusses general
trends in the experiences of these men. These general trends focus on the following:
Muslim racialized identities, interpreted gender differences, Muslims as
dichotomously un-American, Muslim dialogue on terror, experiences of heightened
surveillance, signifiers of Muslim identity, and passing. The section called Strategies
for Stigma Management discusses the ways that Muslim men in this study manage
their stigmatized identity. This section is subdivided into three primary forms of
stigma management developed in the research literature: withdrawing from social
relationships, hiding or concealing Muslim identity, and educating others. The final
main theme, called Religious Structures focuses on the role of religious institutions
and education as central to the management of stigma. This section is subdivided into
the following subthemes: Religious Education, Mosques and Religious Centers, NonProfit Organizations and Interfaith Dialogue.
BEING MUSLIM MEN IN THE UNITED STATES
There is no singular Muslim American experience. Rather, a variety of
intersecting factors and positions contribute to the diverse experiences of Muslim
men in the United States. Most of the participants in this study expressed that their
experiences in the United States were positive, despite increasingly anti-Islamic
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political rhetoric in the United States and increases in the rates of hate crimes over the
past decade (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009). However, certain trends did present
themselves during data collection sessions. The trends discussed in this section are
the most prominent from the research data. These trends are: Muslims hold an
ambiguous racial designation, interpreted gender difference, Muslim men are
depicted as un-American, prompts to discuss terror, the heightened surveillance of
Muslim men, common identifiers for Muslim men, and Muslim men who pass. These
trends verify the existence of stigma in the lives of the men in this study and provide
a basis for understanding the mechanisms and ways that these men come to manage
stigma.
Muslim Racialized Identities
Men in this study had difficulty racially classifying themselves. Though
responses varied, 7 of the 15 men interviewed communicated ambiguity or struggled
to pinpoint a racial designation for themselves. Pasha, a 23-year-old first generation
American born Muslim of Libyan descent, discusses holding two racial designations:
Oh, I usually classify myself as African American, technically, but I put
myself as other for standardized testing and stuff like that. … Also, I wanna
clarify as well, I also qualify myself as Arab as well. So, I was thinking like
standardized testing, but yeah, I'm mostly Arab and then kind of African
American on the side ...
Here Pasha first states that on standardized tests he writes that he is African American
but then later specifies that this African American identity is secondary to his Arab
identity. Other respondents described themselves as Arab or Middle-Eastern and
expressed discontent that applications and other forms did not give them accurate
categories to describe their identities. Still others declined to answer or disregarded
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the racial prompt altogether. For example: Hamza, a 36-year-old immigrant from
India, responded to questions about his racial designation with, “Yeah, I don’t know
what to say about that.” The ambiguity and confusion that racial self-designation
presents these men eludes to the fact that their Muslim identities have become
racialized and are more prominent in explaining experiences of mistreatment. This is
evident in the fact that Hamza, who spoke confidently about his nationality origin was
unable to talk about his own racial designation.
Where defining oneself racially is confusing and does not accurately
categorize Muslim men’s experiences, their religious identity does. Ali, an American
born black and white racially mixed 35-year-old convert Muslim, discusses how his
Muslim identity has taken prominence when discussing his racial identity.
Now, since I've been Muslim I just feel like a Muslim because now I'm looked
at not because of the color of my skin, which most people just think ... When
they see me dressed like this with a beard, before they hear me talk they'll just
think I'm from one of those Muslim countries. I don't really know. I don't
really have... I feel like with that question I'm just me, honestly.
Ali finds that although he is racially classified as mixed, African American and white,
his experiences are more relevant to his religious identity. Because of a combination
of his skin tone and religious signifiers, many people likely mistake or assume his
nationality of origin. These factors cause him to be associated with the Muslim world.
His newly racialized identity is Muslim. He attaches most to this racialized Muslim
identity.
One interviewee provided unique insight into a history of racial ambiguity that
Muslim men might experience. Abraham, an 81-year-old immigrant Muslim from
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India who has lived in the United States for 53 years, describes two seemingly
conflicting racial experiences that he had in 1960s Alabama.
There was a coffee shop on the side of the road, and I said, ‘hey,
[accompanying friend], let me get a cup of coffee.’ So, when I went there, to
that little coffee shop they had two windows. One that said, ‘Whites only,’ and
one that said, ‘Coloreds only,’ and I went to the ‘Coloreds only.’ (laughter).
But, that lady was such a beautiful lady. She kind of smiled and said, ‘Sir, I
will serve you in the other window,’ ‘Whites only’. But I told her, ‘That’s for
Whites only, I am not white.’ And you know, she defined- that stuck in my
mind even to this day. She said, ‘Sir, Coloreds means niggers.’ Woah, could
you believe that? I mean, those days, it was like that. Our definition was so
short.
Race is discussed by many sociologists to be a fluid construct that changes through
history and between social settings (Omi and Winant 2015: 105). In this example, we
see that Abraham classifies himself as colored when he was getting coffee. The shop
worker found his classification to be in error and corrected him. He was not colored
by her definition. Thus, he was not deserving of negative treatment. In contrast to the
first experience, in some scenarios Abraham’s racial identity did cause him to
experience discrimination. Here he discusses the experience of being denied service
because of his race.
And, uh, to come back to Tuscaloosa we had to stop by another city in
Alabama. It starts with W. I am forgetting names- it was a big city. So, we
wanted to stay overnight, because it was midnight and I didn’t want to drive in
the night hour. And we saw a Motel, and there was a sign that said, ‘Vacancy.
Vacancy.’ It was a green sign. “Vacancy. Vacancy.’ So, we went, me and my
wife, and I said, ‘well, we need a room, Sir.’ He said, ‘Sir, there is no
vacancy.’ Do you believe that? And I told him, ‘But, we saw the sign.
‘Vacancy.’’ He said, ‘Sir, you didn’t see it right. Go look at it again.’ I go out
there and it had been switched to ‘no vacancy.’ That sign comes on ‘no
vacancy. No vacancy.’ That’s another experience. I said, ‘okay, we can’t sleep
here, we’ve got to go home to Tuscaloosa.’
Abraham was denied service based on his appearance. These examples were given
consecutively during the interview to discuss Abraham’s racial experiences in the
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United States. Here we see the fluidity of Abraham’s experience as a Muslim man in
the United States even prior to United States military opposition in predominantly
Muslim countries. In some scenarios, men have been treated as honorary whites, not
subjects of discrimination or racial scrutiny. However, the same individuals
experience explicit racial discrimination in different social interactions.
Responses to stigma were present during the racial demographic section of
interviews. Zain, a 27-year-old first generation American born Pakistani Muslim,
responded to the prompt: how do you racially classify yourself? by asserting his
American identity: “Um, well I classify myself as American, first and foremost.
Racially I guess I would say I am- my family hails from the Indian Sub-continent. So,
I guess racially that’s, yeah.” Racially speaking, Zain never gives an exact
designation but instead specifies a general area of the world that he is from.
Furthermore, he asserts that his identity as an American is more important to him than
his racial identity. Other men brought up their “Americanness” during racial
classification. This is relevant to discussions of stigma management. By asserting
one’s American citizenship, individuals communicate that they are allies to the
western world. They distance themselves from an association with terror, and
specifically parts of the world that are associated with terror.
Demographic discussions of race provide an insight to trends of racial
formation among American Muslim men. The ambiguity of racial self-definition is
relevant to current discussions of Muslims as carrying a highly-racialized identity.
The experiences of these men validate the use of racialization to discuss their Muslim
experiences. The research literature also identifies gender to be central to the
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experience of Muslim stigmatization (Razack 2008: 16). The next section focuses on
research participants’ interpretation of gender differences in the experiences of
stigma.
Interpreted Gender Difference
Men in this study expressed their understanding that Muslim women
experienced discrimination differently than them on two fronts. First, men expressed
differences in the experience of stigma in quantity: they understood women
experience discrimination at higher rates than men do. Many men critiqued the focus
of the study, stating that research efforts would be best utilized in studying the
experiences of women. Second, some participants expressed that men experience a
different type of stigma than women did. Religiously practicing men discussed
experiencing stigma related to sexism in addition to a stigma related to terror.
All men in this study discussed women as experiencing discrimination and
mistreatment at higher rates than themselves. Many of these discussions came early
on in interviews and were unprompted by direct questions about the experiences of
Muslim women. For instance, Mostafa, a 23-year-old immigrant from Jordan with
Palestinian ancestry who self-identifies racially as Middle-Eastern, discussed his
understanding of women experiencing mistreatment at greater rates than men when
asked: What is it like to be a Muslim man in the United States?
So ... I don't think that it's a ... Big issue for men as much it is for women to be
honest. Because some women wear the hijab and ... There are some, I can say,
a little bit of racism against Muslims, especially now. But, really, I don't think
it's as hard for men as it is for women.
When asked further about the experiences of women with discrimination men almost
always cited the “hijab” as the primary distinguishing factor for this mistreatment.
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For example, Alex, a 23-year-old White Muslim convert, discusses the hijab and his
understanding of its relation to women’s experiences.
To begin with, females are harassed a hell of a lot more than men. Even here
in [Greensburg]. I found out that there was a Muslim sister who was followed
by a belligerent individual. She actually had to pull out a taser to get him to
back off. Number one it is because they are- the hijab. So, it’s like, right there,
it’s easier. Ironically enough, a lot of the guys that I know have been mistaken
for other ethnicities, and so they’re not recognized as Muslim as often.
Here, Alex differentiates between women, who he understands to be highly visible to
non-Muslims and men whose racial differences could be mistaken. Alex directly
attributes his understanding that women face greater rates of harassment than men to
the visibility of the hijab. The hijab acts as a signifier, or stigma symbol (Goffman
1963: 44), of Muslim religious identity. This visibility is interpreted to make women
an easier target for perpetrators. Men, by contrast, are not as readily identified as
Muslim. The stigma symbols that they hold are either not as exclusive to Muslim men
or are more transient and not as visible in most social interactions.
Men recalled instances of the women in their lives being verbally harassed,
having things thrown at them, and being stalked or followed to the point of being
fearful of physical altercations. Mostafa, quoted above, recalls his mother not wearing
the hijab initially after settling in the United States. This decision came out of a desire
to avoid confrontation. He recalled,
Honestly ... I'll be honest with you, my mom didn't really wear the hijab when
she first, when we first came here. She was ... She didn't really like that
decision but she knew that there was a lot of mistreatment and people would
look at her weird. She decided to put it back on. I was like, ‘ah ...’ Personally,
I was like no, I don't know, maybe if she'd just keep it off so we can avoid
harassment.
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Mostafa remembers supporting his mother’s decision not to wear the hijab, an action
aimed at minimizing negative experience which can be considered stigma
management. Other men discussed their wives’ and daughters’ discontinuing the use
of the “niqab”- a face covering, and instead wearing the hijab. Men differed in
responses as to whether they agreed or disagreed with this practice. However, they
were generally more understanding of the discontinuation of the wearing of the hijab
than they were of other men who concealed their Muslim identities. These
participants’ understanding of women as facing mistreatment at higher rates than men
are consistent with other research that discusses the hijab as a marker of conflated
Muslim religious identity (Selod 2014: 8). The experience of harassment that the
hijab elicits is a collective one. Mostafa says that “we” can avoid mistreatment if
“she” does not wear the hijab. Men and families who experienced stigma through
their association with Muslim women will be discussed in greater detail in the section
that focuses on masculine Muslim identifiers.
When asked about the differences in the experiences of Muslim men and
women, most interviewees focused on the quantity of mistreatment endured.
However, some men discussed unique stigma that they face because of the
intersection of their Muslim and gendered identities. Kareem, a 42-year-old African
American Muslim convert, discusses the stereotype of Muslim men as being sexist:
I think part of the big stereotypes about Muslims is how Westerners perceive
how Muslims separate the sexes to be sexist. I think people come with this
assumption of what your view on women would be and that kind of thing.
That manifests itself in different ways. I don't know if it goes as far as ... I
mean who knows how far the threshold of mistreatment is, but I think it
probably does make them assume that they know what I think. They assume a
bunch of attitudes that I may or may not have based on knowing that I'm
Muslim. Especially among Americans.
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Here Kareem discusses the beliefs that he understands Westerners to hold about
Muslim men. Though he isn’t entirely sure how much this stereotypical view
influences his treatment, he is aware that it exists. He presumes that it affects the way
that he is perceived and interacted with. Other participants discussed being the
recipients of joking about spousal abuse. Portraying Muslim men and their religion as
sexist positions them as enemies to the West and to western values. This portrayal is
evident of a dichotomy that presented itself in research interviews. Men occupy a
social position where they are depicted as enemies to the west and to women in
general, which is discussed further in the next section.
Dichotomously Un-American
Men in this study discussed how the mistreatment that they experienced often
casted them as un-American: enemies to democracy and the Western world. This
sentiment was present in both the experience of stigma and the consequential
management of stigma. Ali is an American-born black and white racially mixed
convert Muslim. His wife is also an American-born convert Muslim. Both Ali and his
wife wear traditional religious clothing. Ali has a long beard and his wife wears the
hijab. During the interview, he recalled a confrontation where he and his wife were
criticized as being un-American.
There have been times where me and my wife have been in the mall ... I can
remember one guy walked by us and said, ‘You're in America.’ I was like,
‘Yeah, we're both American. We were born here and maybe my ancestors
were here before yours.’ He said, ‘Then you need to act like it.’ He's an older
gentleman. He's walking around the mall, he's an older person maybe like 70.
Those are few and far between.
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After providing this initial example, and reflecting on his experiences, he later
offered:
Oh man. Yeah, well there's the incident in the mall, we were talking about
that, that always stands out because that turned into a really big argument. As
I was explaining to the guy that we are American, and we were born here, and
we cheer for the United States in the Olympics.’ Then another lady saw us
arguing and she actually came by and said, ‘Go back where you came from.’ I
turned and I was like, ‘I just got done explaining. That's the whole argument.’
Ali’s discussion reveals that the presentation of this couple as Muslim automatically
designates them as foreign to the United States regardless of their racial background
or nationality of origin. It seems that the logic of the perpetrators is that being Muslim
automatically makes one less American. Furthermore, individuals who are recognized
as Muslim are susceptible to being cast as opponents to the United States. This is
clear in both the confrontation of and response to this mistreatment. Participants in
this study seem to understand their social environment in dichotomous terms. In this
dichotomy, Muslim world and dominant group interests in the western world are in
conflict. This relationship is implicit in expressions of stigma and the management of
said stigma.
In the dichotomous relationship between Muslim men and the western world,
participants often discussed the West as being Christian. The dichotomy is
acknowledged by Muslim men as explaining the stigmatization that they experience.
For instance, Samir, a 36-year-old Egyptian immigrant Muslim, discusses a
frustration with the dichotomous understanding of Muslim-Americans:
This is to clarify, to illustrate my point basically. Someone in Norway, he was
Christian. He just basically went and he killed 75 kids. … When they caught
him, he said, ‘I’m a religious Christian and I worship Jesus and basically I
love Japan because they don’t let Muslims inside. Muslim are bad.’ They said,
‘Okay, those kids were Christian.’ He said, ‘Oh, but their school support
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Muslim people.’ He went to kill the 75 kids, Christian kids, because the
school they attend support Muslim people which is …
My point now why we didn’t say, ‘Oh, see. All Christian are crazy. Look at
this man.’ No, we said, ‘Okay, this man is crazy. That’s it. Bye.’ For us - now,
on the other hand, you see someone like you see Islam do something wrong,
‘All Muslim like this.’ Sometimes it’s bad. Why? Because Muslims and Arab,
we have two basically identities or something. Muslim are bad. Arabs, look at
them, look at them. Look this like caveman.
Samir discusses how a dichotomous understanding of Muslims as bad serves as not
only justification for the persecution and mistreatment of Muslims, but it also
enforces stigma by ignoring the actions of dominant group members, Christians,
while highlighting those of Muslims. In this dichotomy, dominant group members
understand Muslim men as premodern enemies of progress and democracy. They
commit ultimate attribution error and attribute the actions of terrorists to the entire
Muslim faith. The presence of stigma becomes a greater threat to one’s identity if
stigma becomes internalized. The fact that men in this study, such as Zain, asserted
their “Americanness” in interviews is evidence of this internalization. Furthermore,
language used to describe, and in some cases even rationalize experiences of
mistreatment, suggest that participants in this study have internalized some level of
the American-Muslim dichotomy.
The dichotomy that Muslim men find themselves in has influenced parenting
relationships. Kareem discusses limiting his consumption of news media while his
children are watching to protect them from the consequences of negative stigma
during their early identity development.
Now that I have kids, I am fearful for them. I want to make sure that they're
educated and have a sense of being Muslim and also kind of shielding them
from the negative perception that's common here. My oldest is seven. I think
all those things are way too heavy for a seven-year-old to contemplate. It's
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affected me in how I ... I definitely don't watch the news in front of my kids.
Before I don't think it would have mattered. I'm nervous about what kind of
commentary they'll hear and how I'll have to explain the world. Like all kids,
they believe almost everybody's good. People are mostly the same. They go to
schools and they have friends who are Muslim and they have friends who they
know aren't Muslim, but it doesn't go very deep in their understanding of who
people are.
Kareem is fearful for his children and wants to ensure that his children have a sense
of being Muslim. The rhetoric and dichotomous language that surrounds Islam is
understood as a threat to Muslim identities, specifically those that are developing.
Kareem limits watching the news in front of his children to control some of the
information that they are exposed to. This is indicative of an ingroup stigma
management attempt, which would be a fascinating direction for further study.
Kareem does not want his children to internalize an understanding of Muslims as
opponents to the West, he is afraid that this is what they would be exposed to in the
news.
A dichotomous understanding of American-Islamic relations is evident in
most of the trends in the research data. This existence is perhaps most evident in the
continued experience of Muslim men in being prompted by dominant group members
to denounce acts of terror and defend their faith. Given the importance of these
dichotomies, and how people might be framed or labeled, the next section discusses
these experiences and the insight that these instances provide to the AmericanMuslim dichotomy.
Dialogue on Terror
Men in this study expressed that they were pressed to provide commentary
about terrorism, political unrest, or generally defend their faith in the context of
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international crisis. This commentary was both an avenue to demonstrate one’s
personal “Americanness” and an opportunity to educate others about what they
believed were the true teachings of Islam. Though most of these men are American
citizens, many of which have spent most of their adult lives in the United States,
assumed ties to terror forced individuals to denounce acts of terror in a variety of
social settings. For instance, Aidan, a 49-year-old Pakistani immigrant who has lived
in the United States since the age of 4, recalls having to apologize for the actions of
terrorists.
Aidan: If something crazy happens, every time something crazy happens
around this world with close to two-billion Muslims, all of a sudden it has to
be our headache. Some guy runs into a market in Germany and you’re asking
me what I think about it? It’s like, what do you think I think about it? Innocent
people got killed by a crazy guy. I don’t care if that crazy guy was white,
black, or green, and he ran into a bunch of orphans or a bunch of murderers,
you’re still killing people that shouldn’t be killed, you know. So, those
questions do get old, and having to be an apologist for other crazy people gets
old.
Interviewer: How often would you say that occurs?
Aidan: After every incident.
Interviewer: Every one?
Aidan: Every time. If something happens at San Bernadino, when something
happened in the Christmas market, you know, France, Belgium. You know,
whenever it happens, it seems like the Muslims of America, we are supposed
to go down there and put our stamp on it that says that we disagree with it, and
that it’s wrong. Why? Why do we have to say anything?
Here, Aidan expresses that denouncing acts of terror ebbs and flows with changes and
events in national and international news. These responses typically were partnered
with a discussion of the hypocrisy of dominant group members in insisting that
Muslim communities denounce terror while Christianity is rarely the object of
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discussion when religiously fueled terror occurs at the hands of Christians. Aidan
discusses the fallacy that he is assumed to have insight into terror because of shared
religious self-identification. In the Islamic-American dichotomy, Muslim Americans
are presumed to have heightened ties to terror even internationally. Muslim
Americans are socially positioned to the extent that their allegiance to the United
States is questioned routinely. Denouncing terror becomes a means by which Muslim
men must prove their “Americanness.”
Interviewees discussed needs or prompts to discuss politics, terror, and their
faith on two fronts: personal front and a communal front. Men discussed being
requested to discuss their individual religious and political views in response to
terrorist activity. Kareem discusses an employer asking him about his personal
political and religious views in the context of September 11th:
I remember within like a week of September 11th, the director where I was
working invited me to his office to ask a bunch of questions that I think he
thought were benign, but I just thought it was offensive that he would ask me.
He was asking about views on, just politics, the world, what I thought about
September 11th. I know he thought he was just finding out what I thought, but
why aren't you asking anyone else? I thought the premise was offensive.
Kareem is singled out in the work place as a Muslim and is asked to engage in
dialogue with his employer in response to the 9/11 attacks. Kareem infers that his
employer downplayed the interaction. He made it seem small, but Kareem was the
only employee asked about his impressions of terror. This request to discuss terror
was a chance for Kareem to prove his Americanness, or make the case that he is a
good Muslim. Kareem had to engage in this dialogue despite his identity as
American-born citizen. Kareem was irritated with this interaction, as were most men
who were asked personally about politics surrounding terror.
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Other men in this study discussed a community denouncement of terror. This
included official statements from religious leaders to the press and demonstrations
and marches by community organizations. Johnny, an 18-year-old Somali immigrant
Muslim, discusses the condemnation of terror by leaders in the Muslim community.
…and then you feel the need to defend your own faith, every time someone,
every single time. Which is what happens with the general Muslim
community, every time a terrorist attack happened. I don’t know why,
someone in the Muslim community has to come out and condemn the act, of it
saying, it’s just a repeated thing that happens over and over and over.
Similar to Aidan, Johnny expresses that the need to defend one’s faith and denounce
terror ebbs and flows with international news. He expresses prompts to defend faith
as a need. The use of need implies urgency. Men in this study connected the
condemnation of terror to reductions in the mistreatment of Muslims. In an effort to
manage stigma, men in this study attempted to disassociate themselves and their
community from terror. The necessity of denouncing terror implies dichotomous
logic: either denounce and separate oneself from terror, or face scrutiny and possible
mistreatment. Communities denounce terror publicly similarly to individuals.
Generally, respondents were irritated at the prospect of having to speak on
terror. However, some respondents such as Zain viewed condemning terrorist actions
as an opportunity to change dominant group perceptions.
I know a lot of people, I guess, feel stronger about this than I do. I think that
people do have an issue with the statements that are put out denouncing the
attacks. Because Muslim people, their understanding is that amongst ourselves
we know that those are crazy people and they are a minority, a subsect of a
subsect that does crazy things, and denouncing that is kind of asinine. But, my
understanding is that people of other backgrounds and other faiths, they don’t
get it the same way, so it is important to us to denounce those acts. In some
ways doing it over and over again does get old, like, ‘wow, this is getting to
be too much’, but then I think if it furthers understanding for most people then
why not do it.
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Zain describes what he believes is a moral obligation to denounce acts of terror and
defend Islam. This feeling of obligation is discussed in greater detail in the section on
educational stigma management techniques. Participants in this study discussed
insiders as having differing understandings of Islam and its supposed relationship to
terror than outsiders do. Zain possesses an ingroup understanding that Islam does not
condone acts of terror. Because of this insight, he takes on the responsibility to
educate others about Islam. By taking advantage of opportunities to denounce terror,
Muslim men can stigma through education.
Prompts to denounce terror were not the only manifestation of stigma present
in research interviews. Social stigma affected Muslim men in a variety of ways.
Almost all participants reported experiencing heightened surveillance. The following
section discusses the experiences that Muslim men shared that involve dominant
group members watching Muslim bodies.
Feelings of Surveillance
Heightened surveillance in this study refers to men feeling that they were
stared at, extraordinary involvement from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and being filmed or photographed by camera phones. These trends of surveillance
and the fact that participants are conscious of them are evidence of the presence of
stigma in their lives. Experiences of heightened surveillance are important to the
studying Muslim American men because they are evidence of both the presence of
stigma and general distrust. The implied logic of this surveillance is that Muslim men
are enemies to western democracy.
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Almost all the men in this study discussed people staring at them in public
spaces. These experiences were difficult to discuss and often individuals felt that they
had no proof of these experiences. An inability to pinpoint this experience was also
consistent across interviews. Mohamad, a 65-year-old Iraqi immigrant Muslim,
describes and attempts to justify the stares that he receives.
Uh, you know sometimes you cannot express, when you go, and they look at
you, you are a stranger, you know? You know there is something, one of those
family, maybe their relative are a killed soldier in the Middle East, maybe
those family are victims, maybe one of their relatives are victims of
September 11. We have to accept for those to be a little bit, to not have a
smiling face towards us. We have to be a little bit easy. Because as they are a
victim, we are also a victim. So, we don’t take it as target to you as a person,
but targeted to the whole thing, you know? We have to take it more easy. That
was the point. Do you get the point? (Yes) Yes, I do. Sometimes I see the face
of the people when I go gathering or meeting another. When they see Muslims
coming they are just a little bit uneasy. But that doesn’t mean that because of
who I am. No, but because of the idea, the general idea, you understand? Yea.
General stares were common experiences for many of the men in this study.
Participants had difficulty describing how stares happened and in what context they
occurred. These stares and the difficulty of pinpointing stares are like the microaggressions that other marginalized groups experience. Because these aggressions are
subtle, they are often difficult to detect and quantify, though they do influence the
lives of marginalized groups. Heightened surveillance in the form of stares casts
Muslim men as suspect and enemies to democratic values. Hassan discusses how
sentiments about enemies to democracy could be warranted rationale for the stares
that he receives. This not only serves as evidence of heightened surveillance but also
of an internalization of stigma and the dichotomous relationship between Islam and
the West. This heightened surveillance adds pressure to otherwise daily interactions
of Muslim men. Men often discussed how if recognized as Muslim, their actions
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reflected on the larger Muslim community. Hassan rationalizes the uneasy stares that
he receives by discussing the reasons that dominant group members antagonize
Muslims.
A second way that participants felt surveilled was through experiencing a
heightened involvement with the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
For instance, Omar, a 45-year-old American born Muslim whose family is from
Yemen, stated during an interview that every foreign-born Muslim that he knew was
visited by the FBI following 9/11. (No quote is provided because this interview was
not recorded. Omar had previously had negative experiences in being misquoted by
news outlets and insisted on not being recorded.) Men positively reviewed how the
FBI was present at religious centers to discuss reporting procedures and engage with
the Muslim community to find solutions to anti-Islamic discrimination. However, this
relationship is complicated by distrust generated by past policing of Muslim bodies.
Hassan describes the policing of Muslim bodies has influenced how individuals
interact with the United States government.
So there is a law, that used to not be in this country because it contradicts with
democracy, that they can come and get you deported or put in prison without
telling you why. That is a law. However, it has slowed down now, but it still
exists. Anyone can come and exercise it. So this is not expecting democracy
of this country, well known in the world, that you can stand up and give your
opinion, now people are scared, they don’t give their opinion, they lie
actually.
Hassan describes what appears to be the Patriot Act and discusses how it seems
counterintuitive to American values. He also recalled narratives of Muslim people
being detained with a disregard for due process and a respect for their rights.
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Populations of Muslims are fearful to share true opinions or voice their concerns
when government officials come to the mosque because they do not trust officials.
A final way that the men discussed surveillance was through their
observations of how others used technology in their presence. Men were conscious of
people with cell phones when they were involved in interactions regarding
mistreatment and stigma. Samir discusses an altercation where he was defending his
wife and he saw people around him pulling out cell phones.
Okay. If anyone sees the whole situation from the beginning, he will
understand I’m defending my wife. I’m defending myself. I didn’t go to attack
him but this is very bad about YouTube. Sadly, we have YouTube now. …
My point is this: if they took this video, it will be terrorist or something like
this or even if someone said fight in Walmart or something. You never know
if I try to fight with him or maybe I’m telling him, ‘Why you do this to my
wife,’ and he punched me, I’m going to start. No one would know this man
was defending his wife but automatically, he is white, blonde hair and I am
beard and I look Muslim Arab and, ‘Oh, this Arab trying to attack this angel
and he didn’t do anything and this is terrorist.’ I always take care of this and
think about it and also it will give bad name about all Muslims even Arabs.
This was an isolated incident within this study, most interviewees did not discuss
personal altercations escalating to this level. Still, it provides some insight into the
stigmatizing and surveilled positions of Muslim men. Samir discusses how
interactions being caught on film can be manipulated and taken out of context.
Muslims are understood to be a foreign aggressor and White individuals are innocent
victims of terror. He fears that this is the perspective that many viewers will have and
he is cautious because he doesn’t want his actions to reflect poorly on Muslims and
Arabs.
Men in this study were not only filmed during interactions with anti-Islamic
perpetrators, but also during religious practices such as prayer. Red, a 26-year-old
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American born Muslim, discusses people taking pictures of him and his friends while
they were praying in the library:
And while we were praying, it was a silent prayer, so you can really focus on
the noises that are around you, and I heard some people walking by, and after
we finished, someone mentioned that they just took pictures of us, and, and
what they did was they walked by and saw us doing something weird so they
took pictures of us, so that they could show their friends. And you could kind
of hear them you know from the outside saying, saying things like, ‘what are
they doing?’ ‘Oh my gosh!’ ‘What’s going on?’ You know, maybe nothing
threatening, but they sort of, you could kind of get the feeling that they are
sort of making fun of us, because they didn’t know what we were doing. And,
you know, they got snap chat now. I can just imagine, they probably took a
snapchat and put a little caption on it, you know, but you can only imagine,
but you know we didn’t, we didn’t, they just walked by and left, they weren’t
there for us to see.
Muslim students being filmed during times of prayer is evidence that Islamic
religious practices are deviant to normative American life and values. It also shows
how Islamic religious practice is scrutinized. Christian prayer is typically a religious
practice that is appreciated and revered in many social settings and among many
social groups. This experience suggests that when Muslims pray it becomes a novelty
spectacle that warrants documentation and discussion. Statements like “Oh my gosh!”
are evidence of the severity of deviance that Muslim practices are to American
society. Islamic practices are interpreted as a threat.
If American Muslims carry racialized identities that make them susceptible to
stigmatization, a core question becomes: what are features or markers of this
conflated racial category? How are Muslims identified as such? The research
literature has discussed several markers that contribute to men’s classification as
Muslim. This research identifies six identifiers that contribute to masculine
experiences of stigma and influence how said stigma is managed.
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Masculine Muslim Signifiers
Men experienced stigma and discrimination based on markers that are related
to their intersecting identities. Goffman calls these stigma symbols (1963: 44). As
previously discussed, racial and gender identities contribute to the experiences of
Muslim men. Other identities and statuses that affected the experiences of participants
are nationalities, immigrant status, and degree of externally visible religious practice.
The following masculine stigma symbols present themselves in the research:
association with Muslim women, association with other Muslim men, names,
dress/beards, accent, and religious practice. Generally, these markers appear to be
more transient than the hijab. That is, they can be manipulated without compromising
religious practice. These signifiers may not be exhaustive, but they did appear
multiple times during research interviews. Because these signifiers correlate with
strategies for concealing stigma, and because they were often discussed in
conjunction with efforts to conceal identities, they will be discussed further in the
section on stigma management.
Association with Muslim women
Many personal examples of mistreatment that men shared occurred when men
were in public with significant women in their lives. The association with Muslim
women becomes an identifier for men’s Muslim identity. Ali discusses himself and
his wife as being clearly Muslim when they are out. A variety of factors contribute to
this identification, but he specifically mentions the hijab.
I didn't feel looked at different but then 9/11 happened early on so I'd only
been Muslim for a few years but I was practicing, dressing like this, beard and
everything. My wife, she wears the head wrap, and everything, and the long
dress, and all that. Obviously, when we're out we're clearly Muslim.
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In this quote, it appears that Ali and his wife’s experience become a collective one.
Because the hijab is a clear distinguishing factor of Muslim identity men who are
associated with wearers are assumed to be Muslim. Also recall Mostafa’s telling of a
collective stigma experience with his mom, where he described her identification as
Muslim as “our” identification as Muslim. Discussions of identification were often
tied to experiences of mistreatment or discrimination.
In some scenarios, men found it necessary to assert their connection to their
wives. The men discussed stepping into altercations to defend Muslim women and
becoming the focal point of discussion. Samir describes such an instance:
At this time, she was doing something and one of them he was in the middle
and he stopped then he said, ‘Oh my god! Look at her’ loudly. I heard him. Of
course, they think she is alone and my wife didn’t even look at them. Then I
stepped and I stood in front of this guy … The other guys just left but I went
straight in front of this guy and I told him, ‘Hey, this is my wife.’
The initial comments in this exchange were directed at Samir’s wife. However, once
Samir interjected his identity became the focal point of the altercation. This resulted
in his own personal stigmatizing experience which nearly led to physicality.
Association with Muslim Men
In the same way that Muslim men can be identified because of their
association with Muslim women, Muslim men can be identified because of their
association with other Muslim men. Alex discusses how the religious practice of
greeting other Muslims and his association with other Muslims revealed his religious
identity to his classmates in High School:
As a white male, I have the benefit of blending in. So, I always tell people, if
you did not know me from previous experience, if you just saw me walking
down the street you wouldn’t go, ‘oh, that’s a Muslim.’ Some people will be
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like, ‘oh, but you got the beard.’ And I will be like, ‘but we live in [State], it’s
not really distinctive.’ So, in a way, I view myself as a chameleon. I do blend
in. … But, in terms of personal experience, the only one that I have is I was a
Freshman in High School, and you know, I was identified as Muslim by virtue
of - there was some Somali’s in my High School, so one thing that is very
intrinsic to our religion is that we are meant to greet people, you know, ‘AsSalaam-Alaikum,’ ‘Wa-Alaikum-Salaam.’ So by virtue of doing that, they
found out- one person found out that I was a Muslim and gave me some grief
about what happened at 9/11.
Alex discusses how as a white convert he is not identified as Muslim in most social
settings. His racial identity allows for him to pass as non-Muslim. This changed for
him in school when he greeted other practicing Muslims with a religious greeting in
Arabic. It was after this identification that he experienced discrimination and the
stigma of being linked to terror. Other participants reported a hesitancy from people
that they knew to associate with more visibly recognizable Muslims. This will be
discussed in the section on stigma management, but it is indicative that an association
with Muslim men can lead to presumptions about one’s religious/racial identity.
Muslim Names
Names are a prominent personal identifier of men’s Muslim identity. Even
convert Muslims hold names that act as a cue of foreignness. Red describes himself
as not visibly Muslim and goes by a nickname, here he talks about how his birth
name reveals his Muslim identity.
Red: But I know peop- I know some stories with people that didn’t get it as
easy as I did. Um, probably because of the fact that they couldn’t tell, until
they heard what my name was, or yeah.
Interviewer: So, you think your name, caused …
Red: My name gives it away. Maybe not gives it away that I am Muslim, but
it gives it away that I am something different, after looking at me and thinking
that I’m looking like everyone else, and then finding out I have a different
name.
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Red’s name distinguishes him from others. Even if the name does not mark him as
Muslim it singles him out as foreign or other. Names are a transient identifier because
the revelation of a man’s name depends on certain social interactions. Most
altercations associated with name in this study took place in schools or job
applications would be given, in environments where perpetrators knew interview
participants. The fact that names appear to be the most universal identifier for Muslim
men means that men pass with more ease than women do based on religious garb,
such as the hijab.
Traditional dress
Not many of the men in this study wore traditional clothing or long beards,
though many men discussed that these visible markers likely contribute to
experiences of mistreatment. In this quote presented earlier, Ali discusses how being
with his wife and wearing traditional clothing and a beard made him visibly Muslim.
I would say at first I didn't really feel any different. I didn't feel looked at
different but then 9/11 happened early on so I'd only been Muslim for a few
years but I was practicing, dressing like this, beard and everything. My wife,
she wears the head wrap, and everything, and the long dress, and all that.
Obviously, when we're out we're clearly Muslim.
Ali unapologetically presents himself as Muslim. He actually desired to be recognized
as Muslim. Presenting oneself as a Muslim in this way likely correlates with specific
stigma management techniques (which is discussed later in the section called Stigma
Management). The only men in this study who reported regularly wearing traditional
clothing that could identify them as Muslim worked at religious institutions.
However, here Ali recalls how his and his wife’s possession of clear stigma symbols
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unquestionably identified them as Muslim. This could result in experiences of
discrimination.
Language
Language barriers were discussed by individuals as an identifier that
contributes to the singling out of Muslim men. Johnny discusses how having a foreign
accent and limited English speaking skills allowed others to single him out and
mistreat him while he was in school.
Mhm. I do. I think it depends, some people have a little easier time
assimilating to the culture. I feel like it’s worse when you don’t speak English
as well, because then- When I had an accent, or when I didn’t speak English
as well, I felt like people were looking at me even worse than now. But now I
can actually defend myself with words, or at least, present the idea. But when
you can’t even communicate back, then I think that’s even worse for them.
Language here is identified as having two-fold consequences. On the front end, a lack
of language proficiency or the possession of a foreign accent can oust an individual as
a foreign Muslim. Second a lack of language proficiency limits an individual’s ability
to respond to mistreatment. The development of language skills was discussed as
being central to Johnny’s ability to deal with stigma.
Religious practice
For many men, religious practices are the only signifiers that can be externally
used to identify them as Muslim. Religious practices that identify Muslim men in this
study are: prayer, dietary restrictions, and Mosque attendance. Men discussed a need
to be conscious in general about where they would be at certain times of the day so
that they could find a quiet place to be undisturbed. This desire to be undisturbed took
on greater importance because of a hostile climate towards Muslims after terror.
Pasha shares an experience that his friend had when praying in public:
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But it's really hard to find that in a man, unless you see him practicing the
religion in front of you. So like, let's say you see him praying, after he's done
praying ... I heard of an instance he told me about himself. He was praying in
the middle of the mall, outside of the mall or something, and a couple people
saw him praying and they just peed right next to him. Because like, I guess
they knew what kind of religion he practiced. I mean, I guess that's what he
assumed, like they knew what kind of religion he practiced.
Pasha discusses the visibility that public practice creates. Even if an individual does
not appear Muslim, postures that are typical to Muslim prayer times single
individuals out and make them vulnerable to mistreatments. This vulnerability is both
social and physical; social in the sense that men who are praying are highly visible,
and physical because when positioning oneself face down to the ground for prayer
means that one cannot defend oneself. Pasha states that people who saw his friend
praying used this identifier to discriminate against him.
Signifiers for Muslim identity increase the visibility of Muslims. However, as
discussed previously, masculine stigma symbols seem to be more transient than the
hijab. Men who hold transient signifiers or do not possess signifiers in general can be
pass as non-Muslim.
Passing as Non-Muslim
Several men in this study discussed holding identities that allowed them to
pass as a non-Muslim. Goffman (1963) discusses passing in conjunction with the
visibility of one’s stigmatizing status (48). Men who pass describe themselves as
holding limited markers of foreignness or Muslim identities, or as being less visibly
Muslim. Red describes himself as half-Iraqi, half-American and highly passing. Here
he discusses his experiences of being mistaken as a non-Muslim:
Red: The cool thing is, that a lot of people don’t know that I am Muslim at
first. So, let’s say I’m with a stranger, and someone that is obviously, that you
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can tell, that appears to be Muslim, let’s say walks by or does something.
Once they are out of the area, and I’m alone with that stranger, they talk to me
as if, as if you know, I’m just a white American, or uh Christian like them or
that I’m not Muslim. And they’ll mention things, which is pretty fun.
Interviewer: And what’s like the difference I guess, so what, what kinds of
things might they say?
Red: They could say things like, things that I don’t even feel that they actually
believe, they would say things like ‘oh, this guy right here, he probably wants
to kill all of us.’ You know, they could say, ‘this guy here, he’s probably
planning his attack right now.’
Interviewer: And then how do you respond to situations like that?
Red: Uh normally, … usually I’ll just say ‘ha, yea, sure, yea.’ You know, just
to sort of end the conversation there, just because, rather than replying with a
similar statement to keep it going, I’ll sort of just diffuse it like ‘hm yeah.’ On
rare occasions, I might actually say, I might actually stick up for them, also by
not expressing my identity. So as if they think, ‘one of them is sticking up for
someone that appears to be Muslim.’ So, it’s sort of like ‘wow, why are you
sticking up for that guy? Aren’t you supposed to be one of us, don’t you think
the way I do?’ So, I’ll try to approach them from their own perspective, and
that usually, they usually realize that they’re just making a stupid statement,
and it shouldn’t be said.
In this exchange, Red recounts his ability not only to pass as a non-Muslim, he passes
to the extent that others feel comfortable enough to make jokes at the expense of
other assumed Muslims in is presence. We can also see in Red’s response that he can
and does combat these negative experiences without revealing his identity as a
Muslim. This is relevant to his strategies for stigma management. Men who hold
Muslim identities that are not as externally visible, such as Red, must make decisions
about revealing their stigma identities in a variety of social settings. In some
instances, it is most appealing to defend Muslim identities without revealing his
identity. However, Red risks being identified as dichotomously “un-American” by
aligning oneself with a Muslim other. So, he elects to keep his identity hidden.
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Participants also talked about the experience of passing as a form of privilege.
They understand themselves to experience stigma at reduced rates because they are
less easily identified as Muslim. The ability to pass was not uniform among the men.
Some men pass more than others. Aidan discusses the privilege that he enjoys as a
highly-passing Muslim man in the United States:
Because if I walk down the street, I have an American accent and you don’t
know what the heck I am. You know, I could be Italian, I could be Asian, I
could be anything, I could be Hispanic. If I for example, if I wore traditional
garb or if I had a really long beard or I wore a special hat, you can tell those
guys apart so people would probably look at me different. I wear regular
clothes and I talk regular, so. So, it puts me at that risk, the only way that I
would get in trouble is if somebody actually knew, or if somebody saw me
coming in and out of the mosque, you know, if somebody had a beef and
wanted to do something. But you know if I was just walking down the street
or sitting in a coffee shop nobody is going to know what my background is.
Aidan believes that his western appearance deflects mistreatment that he would
experience as a Muslim man. This western appearance is mostly derived from his
dress and speech. Because of this appearance, Aidan’s phenotype and skin tone could
be attributable to other racial or ethnic backgrounds. Though some men did discuss
being the recipients of mistreatment directed at Latino and other ethnic and racial
groups, the ability to pass as something other than Muslim was advantageous in
certain social settings. Aidan believes that the only indicators of his Muslim identity
to strangers is his practice. Therefore, he observes some privilege with respect to
mistreatment directed at Muslims.
Some men held other identities that were simply more prominent than their
Muslim identities which allowed for them to pass as only those identities. Johnny, is a
Somali immigrant, but his racial designation takes precedence in social interactions.
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People are still going to be like, first, if they don’t know my name they’re not
going to think of me as Muslim. And if they do they’re just going to be like,
oh he’s from Africa they are going to dismiss that I would ever be in ISIS.
Johnny believes that his name is the only indicator of identity that he holds that
explicitly marks him as Muslim. He believes that his African American identity is the
most prominent in social interactions and therefore is the most responsible for the
treatment that he receives. Racially white participants had similar experiences of
passing. Discussions of passing typically centered on religious identifiers. The
prominence or lack of these identifiers contribute to an individual’s ability to pass and
to avoid stigma related mistreatment.
The ability to pass is central to the ability of these men in to choose how they
manage stigma. Individuals who are unable to pass are less able to conceal a
stigmatizing identity. It appears that men are more able than women to conceal their
identity without compromising religious practice. The following sections focus on
stigma management strategies used by research participants.
STIGMA MANAGEMENT AND MUSLIM MEN
Stigma management strategies in this study were consistent with categories
developed in the research literature. These categories include withdrawing from
relationships with others, concealing stigmatizing identities, and education aimed at
minimizing the consequences of stigma (Schroeder and Mowen 2014: 459).
Interviews appear to reveal a hierarchy in the desirability and functionality of certain
stigma management strategies. Most of the men seemed to point toward the educating
others as the most ideal and true to their religious identities. The next sections discuss
stigma management techniques that present themselves in the research data.
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Withdrawing from Social Relationships
The first strategy for stigma management in this study is withdrawing from
social relationships. This category is discussed first because participants appeared to
have the least amount of control of this strategy, while it influences the use of other
stigma management techniques. When questioned about how backlash from terror
and stigma shaped influenced their social relationships, participants described their
social networks as a naturally filtering group. This withdrawal had more to do with
the actions of others and the communities that they were involved in than conscious
decisions on their part. Thus, social withdrawal often seemed to be out of the control
of interviewees. Furthermore, the disintegration of social relationships with nonMuslims is counterintuitive to stigma management strategies involving the education
of others. Still, men did report that their relationships were influenced by their
racialized and religious identities. Pasha describes the process of changing friendships
as he engaged more fully in his religion.
Like for example, it's a friend of mine, we still keep in touch every once in a
while, and hoop or whatnot. But he kind of stopped messing with me after I
was really active in my Mosque … So, he's like, ‘I don't mess with that crowd,
it's too many Arabs in that Mosque.’ Like, ‘dude you're Arab.’
Pasha believes that his friend did not want to be associated with Arab Muslims so the
friendship dissolved. The irony in the rationale behind this friend’s disassociation
with religious Muslims was that there were too many Arabs in the mosque even
though his friend, himself, is Arab. This rationale could be evidence of an internalized
stigma. This friend desires to disassociate with a group that has been stigmatized.
While few participants discussed explicitly ending or withdrawing from
relationships in response to stigma, men discussed their closest networks as being
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shaped by attributes such as awareness, understanding, and open-mindedness. Johnny
describes consciously shaping his closest network. He discusses how he generally
spends time with people who are well informed regarding Islam and world affairs.
And plus, generally the people that I hang out with are more, are at least a
little bit smarter and can do their own research, in terms of, knowing what’s
going on around them. So, it’s not like I have to worry about someone making
a stupid comment. … I just hang out with people that are more informed.
Because then they’ll, they’ll have a better idea, about what’s going on, rather
than, just asking weird questions.
Johnny discusses qualities that he seeks out in the people that he associates with. He
seeks out close relationships where people are informed and don’t scrutinize his
identity with questions about Islam and terror. Johnny continues to discuss how his
relationships are shaped:
I believe this thing, there’s this thing that says that you are the average of the
five people that you hang out with. And um, I think for me, I have to hang out
with someone who is more informed because, because if I were ever to have
to introduce them to my family as friends, then I wouldn’t want them to kind
of, make any stupid remarks, or, like I want them to be more informed so they
know the truth and, they’re more open to learning about it rather than
someone who’s blinded by the media or something. Like then you can’t really
change that person’s mind about it, because you are always going to start
fighting about your core beliefs and then they won’t ever believe you and it’s
just worse that way.
Men discuss their friendships as being a self-filtering group. They did not want to
hang out with closed-minded individuals outside of religious differences, so their
close networks generally were not influenced by discussions that focused on their
racialized and religious identity. Johnny believes that the people that he associates
with influence who he is. Thus, his social network is filled with the type of people
that he wants to be. He fears being too close to individuals who he considers to be
ignorant of social politics and of Islam. Engaging too closely with this ignorance
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would cause him to undergo scrutiny related to his religious identity. He hopes to
avoid this scrutiny by controlling his network.
Participants believed that their social networks were organically shaped by
their identities. By being involved in mosques and religious institutions, many of
these men’s associates are likely practicing Muslims. Kareem explains how his
relationships have changed with the natural progression of life.
Not really so much because of that. The people that you associate with are
already a self-filtering group. Aside from places like ... Work was probably
the only place. You don't really rub up against people who will have
drastically different views of life than you. At work, there's a culture of,
‘Well, this is a business place, we don't talk about controversial things,’ so it's
okay. I was 19 when I became Muslim and I'm almost 43 now, so I'd say the
only friends who've faded away or whatever, I think it's just part of the natural
progression of life. As you get older, you don't run with the same people you
ran with as a teenager. I don't attribute that to Islam in anyway, I think it's just
getting older.
Kareem states that “the people that you associate with are already a self-filtering
group.” This in response to being asked how friendships and relationships have
changed following social backlash related to terror. He believes that as you get older,
your relationships naturally change. This organic shaping of social relationships
means that many men don’t have close friendships with people who hold drastically
different views than they do. The only place that this would occur is work and
professional etiquette limits most stigma-oriented questioning that would occur.
Recall that Goffman (1963: 73) theorized that complete social withdrawal was
near impossible for individuals to remain engaged socially in society. According to
interview data, social withdrawal appeared to be most relevant, as it related to other
stigma management strategies. When participants were socially and physically in
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proximity to dominant group members and non-Muslims, they needed to manage
their stigma using other strategies.
Concealing One’s Identity
The second method for stigma management involves the concealing of
stigmatizing identities. Though this method was present in interview data, many of
the references to this strategy involve people that interviewees know rather than
interviewees themselves. It appears that hiding one’s identity is not the stigma
management strategy of choice for these Muslim men. Individuals made conscious
efforts to hide their Muslim identities, others were requested by parents or loved ones
to conceal these identities to protect themselves from mistreatments, but most
reported the ways that those around them attempted to hide their identities as
Muslims. Red discusses his desire to pass as a non-Muslim in connection to the
creation of a less foreign nickname: “I am going to be honest. I do it too. Because
sometimes it’s just easier and quicker if people think that you are one of them.”
Implicit in this statement is the dichotomous relationship between the Muslim world
and the western world. Life is easier in America for individuals who belong more
fully to the western world and thus, sometimes it is advantageous to conceal one’s
Muslim identity. By hiding Muslim status individuals can avoid the negative
consequences of stigma. These identity concealing stigma management strategies
relate to masculine Muslim stigma symbols such as association with visibly Muslim
men or women, Muslim sounding names, traditional Muslim dress, and Islamic
religious practices. Strategies identified in this study aimed at hiding Muslim
identities are: controlling public interactions, name changing, beard shaving, and
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practicing religion carefully. The following sections will discuss these stigmamanagement strategies.
Controlling public interactions
Muslim men discussed how men that they knew negotiated who they
associated with in public settings. This identity concealing strategy seems to overlap
some with the withdrawal from social relationships, however, by controlling public
interactions this research focuses on how others are perceived based on who they are
associated with by others. This discussion specifically focused on how Muslims
limited public association with other more visible Muslim men. Hassan is a 36-yearold immigrant from India who dresses in traditional clothing, wears a thick beard, a
head scarf, and self-describes himself as visibly Muslim. Here he describes an
interaction with one of his congregants where requests were made to meet in a
different location the next time that they decide to meet.
I'll give you an example of when I was, one of my congregation members. We
were chilling. We just had to talk about certain things for the community, so
we're talking. Afterwards, he was ... Like- I mean, I thought everything went
fine. We got everything done and we walked out, it was actually a restaurant.
So, we walked out, and he was like, ‘Yo, you know, we gotta go, we just go to
whatever houses next time, or go to the library, go somewhere.’ We really
didn't talk about why or anything, but I could tell that's what the issue was.
That he felt uncomfortable because of maybe some of the looks, or the second
looks, or something like that. Where those kind of things ... I don't look at it as
a mistreatment, as once again, it's not a big deal. That's something ... I don't
want to use the word immune, but I've been accustomed to, you know?
Hassan describes the actions of someone he knows direct towards himself. His
congregation member was uncomfortable meeting in a public place and requested to
meet in a more private location in the future. Hassan’s visible Muslim identity is an
association that his congregation member wanted to manage. Whereas Hassan was

62

used to the attention that his appearance brought, his congregation member was
uncomfortable with the heightened surveillance, or hegemonic-gaze he received from
dominant group members. By controlling this public interaction this man hopes to
delimit his interactions with Muslims who have a more prominent Muslim
appearance. The result, given the backlash that Muslims face, is to limit stigma.
Name changing
Men in this study discussed name changing as a form of concealing one’s
Muslim identity. Name changing in this study refers to the selection of nicknames.
One man in this study changed his name to conceal his religious identity. However,
other men discussed how men that they knew changed their names to hide their
identities. Still, when some participants were presented with the opportunity to
choose pseudonyms for this study, they selected western or otherwise ambiguous
pseudonyms: Alex, Johnny, and Red. Red discusses the process of choosing to go by
a nickname as he entered middle school just after 9/11. The father of a close friend
was influential in this process.
This is when I was going into middle school, and, ironically enough, right
after 9/11 … Going into middle school you are in a new school, you got new
classmates, new teachers, everything is new. ‘So, how are people going to
look at you?’ He’s telling me this, he said, ‘you can pretty much change your
whole image now.’ He said, ‘Do you want to go by that?’ He would explain
things strategically. He would make jokes out of it. So, he would joke around
about people trying to pronounce my real name. He would say, ‘no you don’t
want that to happen. Just go in there and tell them two letters. Tell them like
initials. Tell them that’s what I go by.’
Red’s experience involves strategic influence by a trusted adult in his life. The
decision to change his name was not haphazard with unintended consequences. It
involved a conscious effort at deflecting his Muslim identity. Red acknowledges that
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the events following 9/11 likely influenced the direction of this interaction. Red
explains that choosing a new name creates a new image for himself. Red continues to
describe this experience:
And so, I was thinking about it and I said you know maybe that would be cool
if I had like a nickname like that. And so, from that point on, I went to middle
school the first day and the teacher was calling roll and was like, ‘if anyone
goes by something else just let us know.’ And even though there were a few
people that were there from elementary that knew me, I’m raising my hand
saying, ‘yeah, I go by this now,’ and I’m getting a few looks like, ‘what the
hell, no you’re not, I just saw you, last summer you were going by something
else.’ But a lot of people that didn’t know me, they just thought that, that was
the norm, they ran with it, and from that point on I was known by something
else.
Red creates a new image of himself as a dominant group American adolescent, a
white American. Name changings ties to identity are deep and offer considerable
nuance. In what seems to be a trivial whim to some of his classmates that knew him
previously, Red deflects his Muslim identity and changes how he is known to those
who interact with him. Recall that earlier, Red discussed being highly passing as a
non-Muslim and his only tie to the Islamic world was his name. By providing a
disidentifier (Goffman 1963:44) in the form of a new name, Red communicates that
he is a dominant group member.
Not all men in this study who were known by nicknames consciously
deflected their Muslim identity. Other participants in this study who had nicknames
were either assigned those nicknames at an early age by someone else or reported that
they selected a nickname based on the ease of pronunciation. Participants were
familiar with other individuals who changed their names as a response to stigma.
Here Johnny discusses his brother’s use of a nickname:
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I think my brother is, he has assimilated a little too much into the American
culture. He is trying to conceal his identity, in terms of his Muslim faith and
stuff like that, I think he even goes by a nickname, or something. Just so he
doesn’t have to explain something. So, it just affects some people differently.
Johnny believes that his brother conceals his Muslim identity by going by a
nickname. This is consistent with the trend that men in this study tend to discuss
activities that conceal one’s identity in the third person. This allows for Johnny to
critically assess these moves. In Johnny’s opinion, his brother has assimilated too
much into the American culture. To him, being Americanized dichotomously means
losing some of his Muslim identity.
Some men were critical of the decision to go by a nickname to conceal one’s
religious identity. Kareem, a Muslim father, expressed some disapproval at the
prospect of his children concealing their Muslim identity.
Not really. If I overheard my kids doing that, I would get on them. Names are
traditional, your name is what I gave you. I mean they can have nicknames, as
long as it's not obviously trying to disguise their identity.… That's one thing,
like I said before, I would actively resist the urge to do that. I mean that's a
degree of selling out in my mind. I don't say that to bash people who do it. I
know I feel comfortable with being born here. I have certain things, I can't be
deported unless I do something crazy or whatever. There's a kind of privilege
that comes with being a citizen, and a natural born citizen that others don't
have. I don't hold it against others who do, or if someone wants to go by Mo. I
would resist that for myself.
Many individuals discussed a morality of name changing to conceal one’s Muslim
identity. Even Red, who changed his own name, discussed this morality and religious
and traditional teachings that are considered during discussion of this strategy.
Kareem’s sentiment about name changing reflects a dichotomous understanding
between the Muslim and western worlds. To some religiously practicing men,
individuals who change their names assimilate too much or there is concern that they
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might lose some of their Muslim identity. Kareem also expresses that in navigating
responses to mistreatments, he has to consider privileges that he holds as an
American-born Muslim. He holds moral attitudes directed at the management of
stigma. However, he acknowledges that navigating prejudice and mistreatment is a
complex experience that is not uniform.
Despite few of the men changing names to hide religious identity, most of the
participants interviewed were familiar with discussions that center around name
changing. Many of the men cited the same example to discuss name changing:
Mohamad who chooses to go by Mo. Aidan provides insight into both the example of
Mohammed choosing to go by Mo and actual individuals who choose Americanized
nicknames:
You see it all the time, one example: people named Mohammed, they go by
Mo. You know, and people that may be a more tough name to say, but the
syllables and stuff they will just shorten it. They just make an American name
or for example if someone’s name is Hah-ress they might change it to Harris,
Adam, Ah-dom. You know, they will try to make it Americanized, so. And I
think that people did that all along, not because of being prejudiced, but
because, you know, when you were a little kid, if somebody butchers your
name, that’s embarrassing. People sometimes just change their name, just to
make it easier. But I think some people say it now because they don’t want to
be singled out.
Aidan leads with a discussion of the popular Mohammed goes by Mo example.
However, the same practice extends to other names. Names that do not fit the
Western dialect are often changed to avoid either mispronunciation or stigma. Aidan
asserts that people have changed Muslim names “all along,” but the presence of antiIslamic stigma has given new motivation and rationale to name changing. When
interviewees were further asked about the Mohammed to Mo example for name
changing, some stated that they were unsure of where that example came from. It
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could be that Mohammed is simply the most common name in Islam. However, other
individuals discussed dialogue between religious scholars on the matter of namechanging. These scholars used this example specifically to discuss the morality of
changing one’s beautiful and religiously inspired name to conceal one’s identity. The
discussion of religious teaching in tandem with name changing is evidence of a
socialization that guides individuals to proper stigma management techniques.
Beard shaving
Participants discussed the shaving of one’s beard as a mechanism of hiding
one’s stigmatized identity. None of the men interviewed reported shaving their beard
to conceal their identities, though they knew people who did or were requested by
loved ones to do so. Beards are not exclusive to the Islamic faith, nor is it mutually
understood by all of Muslims that men should wear beards. However, many sects do
view the beard as important in creating visible distinctions between Muslims and nonMuslims and thus this traditional symbol becomes a masculine Muslim signifier.
Pasha discusses a relative shaving his beard in response to the 9/11 attacks.
Yeah. Kind of ... A relative did that, a relative of mine did that after 9/11. And
he used to have a full beard, he kind of shaved it off. I remember it. It kind of
affected Muslims in two different ways. I'll say this, a lot of them feel like
they need to move more ... What's that word? They need to be more
Americanized, more assimilated into the culture. And at the same time, kind
of lose their Muslim identity.
Pasha discusses how some Muslims attempted to become more Americanized after
terror. The idea of becoming more American is understood as existing in a dichotomy
against being more Muslim. In this dichotomous relationship, Muslim is associated
with foreignness and having a full beard is associated with being Muslim. Thus,
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shaving one’s beard becomes a method for disassociating with a racialized identity
that is stereotyped as a threat to American society.
Even men who intentionally choose not to conceal identities were requested to
do so by loved ones. Zain shares that every time terrorist activities occur, his parents
ask him to shave off his beard.
Zain: Um, any time there is a large terror attack my parents ask me to shave
my beard off.
Interviewer: Really?
Zain: Yeah, they- my parents, they’re really fearful of anything going on,
anything happening to their children so whenever we went into an airport or
something they always want to make sure that we look decent and everything.
They just try to give us, I guess, a heightened awareness of, you know, our
surroundings and everything and to approach things in, I guess, in a, yeah.
Zain’s parents are fearful for how a visibly recognizable association with Islam may
influence their son’s safety. Though Zain does not share this sentiment, his parents
ask him to engage in stigma management strategies aimed at concealing his identity.
These requests hope to ensure Zain’s safety by making his appearance is one less
associated with terror, and in part to allow him to navigate social environments
affiliated with stigma, such as an airport with greater ease. This request provides
confirmation that beard shaving can be explicitly aimed at managing stigma.
Controlling public religious practice
The men discussed limiting or controlling public religious practices, such as
prayer, to protect identities. Participants discussed the vulnerability that public
religious practice creates. Many stated that they were already conscious of where they
were at certain times of the day for prayer regardless of post-terror backlash.
However, men did express taking extra precautions to ensure their safety before
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praying following backlash related to terror. Kareem discusses changes in his
perceived safety following Islamophobic rhetoric.
When I travel on road trips, often we pray five times a day, you know. Before,
I would stop at a rest area and just go over in the grass, pull out the rug, pray,
get back in the car and done. Now, I'll still do that but I pause and I look
around really closely to see ... I measure up who's around and figure out if I
see somebody who I think might be a problem. My wife or whoever I'm
traveling with, if they're in the bathroom, I'll wait for them to come out so that
there's someone looking, that kind of thing. Whereas before, especially in the
early days before 9/11, I wouldn't care I'd be like, ‘Whatever.’ You might
expect some random person, at most somebody would say something rude. It's
not really that big a deal. Since then, I've been aware that there's some people
who might actually do something harmful.
In this case, the line between taking added precautions as measures of safety and
controlling religious practice to provide a level of invisibility are blurred. Though
Kareem discusses this heightened consciousness as a measure to protect himself,
protective action would naturally include a limitation of visible religious practice.
Other men discussed doing prayers in seated positions in vehicles, as something that
they do when they are on the road. Electing to remain in a vehicle could have identity
concealing purposes for some men.
Some stigma management involved a combination of identity concealing
strategies. Alex, describes a reluctance to pray in public in a large group.
If I was in a group, I would advise the group, let’s not do anything in public.
Like, if a prayer time is almost up. So, let’s say the fourth prayer- we’ve
passed that time and it’s time for the fifth prayer- you try your best to pray
before that fifth prayer- before that time begins. So, if I was in a group I
would try to do it in a more private setting. Personally, I- I’ve prayed in
public, and it’s more so- I joke around- it’s me being southern. So, you know,
f the world. If you want to give me grief, go ahead. You know, in a group I
would say, ‘hey, let’s be careful.’
Here, a combination of controlling public practice and association with other Muslims
is employed. Because of his white American identity, Alex typically is not perceived
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as Muslim based on his appearance. In particular, his white racial identity means that
strangers would not be able to identify him as Muslim unless he communicated or
demonstrated his religious affiliation. In this instance, Alex discusses the combination
of public prayer and praying in a group as a source of discomfort that he hopes to
manage. He is protective of his Muslim friends and feels that praying in a large group
might make them vulnerable to mistreatment. He requests that their large group prays
in a more private setting.
Other men limited other religious practices to conceal identity. Ali discusses
how people that he knows do not religiously greet each other in Arabic to hide their
Muslim identities.
I've even met some people who they're - back to the identifier and other things
that would identify you as Muslim. Speaking Arabic or saying, ‘As-SalaamAlaikum,’ giving them the Islamic greeting and things in public when you see
another Muslim, for example. Some Muslims will be shy to do that. If they
see another Muslim they don't want to say, ‘As-Salaam- Alaikum,’ or they
don't want to acknowledge you because they just want to shop, get it, get out.
They have that shyness because of that.
Religious greetings become a stigma symbol for Muslim identity. Ali believes that
some Muslims neglect to greet others in this way because they do not want to be
publicly affiliated by dominant group members with the Islamic faith. By doing so,
they hope to avoid social scrutiny.
Interviews from men in this study reveal a hierarchy in the negotiations of
Muslim stigma. Religiously practicing men in this study appear to value the educating
of others more than the withdrawal from social relationships or concealing one’s
Muslim identity. This hierarchy is evident in the discussions of identity concealing
strategies in the third person and the first-person ownership of educational
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managements of stigma. The next section will focus on educational stigma
management strategies that presented themselves in research interviews.
Educating Others
The third major way that participants managed stigmatizing Muslim identities
was through educating non-Muslims. Though some of the men in this study attempt
to hide their Muslim identity in some social settings, many of the men interviewed
expressed a desire to be recognized as Muslim. Ali discusses this desire: “I want to be
recognized as a Muslim. If that's what comes with it, that's fine. I'm proud to be
Muslim.” A desire or willingness to be publicly associated with Islam was often
accompanied by the final method for the management of stigma involves educating
others. Recall that Goffman (1963) described individuals who are open with their
stigmatizing identities as being in the most mature stage of their stigma identity
development (102). Most of the respondents in this study personally discussed
managing stigma through helping build others’ awareness about their religion.
Participants who unambiguously present themselves as Muslim discussed
opportunities that terror presents for the education of non-Muslims and believed that
exposure and relationship building between dominant group members and
subordinate group members would be key to educational stigma management.
A great deal of discussion surrounding the education of non-Muslims about
Islam centered on the opportunity that the aftermath of terror provides. Hassan
discusses the opportunity that terror and its aftermath has created.
We hate what those people did on 9/11. It hurt us probably the most out of
everyone, all the effects, or the reaction, and the effects of that tragedy that
took place on 9/11. But there's no question that there was opportunity, you
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know. There was people that ... Islam was put on the map when it wasn't on
the map. You know, people started looking into it.
The services attended at site 3 often involved a discussion of the opportunity that
current rhetoric about Muslims and stigma provided for practicing Muslims to show
the true teachings of Islam. Hassan discusses a direct relationship between the events
of 9/11 and opportunity to spread what they believe to be orthodox teachings of
Islam. Whereas 9/11 was a travesty for the United States, he asserts that the fallout
from this event issued considerable stigma to individuals who can be identified as
Muslims. It is worth noting that Hassan speaks to the experience of terror related
backlash from a collective stance, using “we” and “us” language. Collectively,
Muslims experience stigma directly tied to acts of terror. However, out of this
negativity, Islam became a popular topic of discussion and inquiry for dominant
group members. As a result, more people learned about what Islam was. In the long
run, Hassan believes that this bodes well for Muslims.
Several interviewees discussed how the mistreatment of Muslims and antiIslamic rhetoric and policy making by President Donald Trump created opportunity
for education about the Muslim faith. This opportunity was directly related to the
response of the Islamic community to stigma. Pasha describes this opportunity when
questioned about the future of Muslims in the United States.
I honestly think that it's really hopeful. This could get extremely crazy, to
where you might throw an executive order that's completely worded correctly,
that just puts us all in concentration camps, or whatever. But, it still brings, it
still puts Islam as ... In the front page. And if you put that in the front page,
then people will be more inclined to learn more about it. Especially if it's
positive news. Like, people fighting for Islam. Not like, legit fighting but
protesting for it, speaking out against these executive orders, or whatnot.
Same thing like 9/11, it was, terrible thing that happened for everyone. Like
for all the families that were there, that were involved in the horrible thing that
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happened to America, in general. But, no one really knew about Islam before
that. That highlighted Islam, and that made people convert to Islam. Not in a
horrible way, but in a weird way, that kind of made people want to be
educated more on it. Sometimes these bad events, show that Islam isn't that
bad. Show that, true Islam isn't that bad. You're trying to lockdown on
terrorists, why are you kind of classifying Muslims as terrorists? When their
religion is not that ... When people that are like that completely take religion
out of context, so on and so forth.
The success of anti-Islamic rhetoric has brought Islam and the experiences of
Muslims to the forefront of media and discussions regarding civil rights. Pasha
compares the experiences of Muslims in America to those of other racially oppressed
groups in western history. He mentions concentration camps, which appears to be a
reference to either the confinement of Jewish peoples in Nazi Germany or of Japanese
peoples in World War II America. Both groups were casted as political opponents to
their host countries and conventional history telling frowns on the treatments afforded
to these groups. The implicit message in this comparison is that these travesties begin
with stigma, and that by reflecting on these histories, we can avoid repeating them
with Muslim people. Pasha believes that even though political figures target Muslims
with legislation, the attention that Islam receives thus becomes positive when people
united to defend Islam. Pasha presumes that dominant group members knew little
about Islam prior to 21st century terror. By contrast, he asserts that many of these nonMuslims are becoming more interested and more educated about Islam and Muslims.
The positive education of others about what true Islam is, is viewed as central to
combatting stigma. The discussion of Islam after events of international terror and
ensuing political rhetoric is an opportunity for this education to take place.
Most of the men who viewed current political dynamics as opportunistic to
managing Muslim stigma believed that exposure to Muslims would rid many people
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of ignorance. This contact was often talked about using personal testimonies. Hassan
shares a personal interaction that he had where he could engage in education relating
to his stigmatized identity.
I remember once in - it was a Rite-Aid. I was getting my passport pictures - I
was getting something done, and this woman approached me, and we had a
long conversation for like half an hour in the store, and we actually ended up
trading information, contacts, and you know, she invited me to come to her
church. And this is just out of me going shopping, you know. It's nothing. So,
it also becomes an avenue of opportunity to spread the true teachings of Islam.
Hassan connects this experience directly to the presentation of himself as visibly
Muslim. Recall that he wears traditional clothing, a head wrap, and a thick beard
everywhere that he goes. His symbolic presentation elicited a discussion about his
faith, which allowed him to not only share what Islam really was with her, but it
provided him with an invitation to educate more people on a larger scale.
Some of the men believed that exposure to Muslims was such a strong
deterrent of negative stigma that stigma management education did not require
explicit teaching or dialogue. Samir uses the following experience to prove this logic.
Before we know each other, he used to look at me. Look at me and I’m
working and he's like filming me. He's not filming me but you know what I
mean like staring at me. I look at him and he is like no eye contact. For almost
two months, three months, when I come in the morning, I do something and I
look by back and he's like … Then I started coming and say, ‘Hey, good
morning,’ and then he says, ‘Good morning.’ Anyways, long story. In the end,
he told me, ‘Samir, you are the best’ … Why? Because he starts speaking with
me, ask me question. No problem. If you see something strange, just go ask
the person.
Samir discusses a work relationship that began as a hostile one. He experienced a
hyper-surveillance in the form of staring from this coworker over a 2 to 3-month
period. However, he believes that by being pleasant to this coworker, this positive
experience with a Muslim caused him to have a change of heart. In other words, there
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is something about knowing and being known by others that detracts stigma. Once
bridges such as this are built with non-Muslims, communication about religious
beliefs and myths can occur that are central to overcoming stigmatization. Samir
finishes this story by stating that once people are willing to ask questions, then
stereotyping and stigma can be resolved.
Participants who engaged in positive stigma management strategies discussed
Muslims as holding responsibility to dispel stigma the surrounding Islam. Ali believes
that this responsibility extends to just being a positive contributor to the communities
that they live in.
I definitely feel like it's a big responsibility to be a Muslim in the community
and to actually be part of the community so that people can see, ‘Well that
guy's a Muslim and he's not too bad. Maybe all Muslims aren't like that.’ Big
time.
Some men believed that Islamic communities were guilty of isolating themselves.
Because of this, these men made it more difficult to counter negative Muslim stigma.
Aidan discusses this responsibility and the ways that Muslims fail to adhere to this
responsibility here:
Everybody has their own stereotypes and their own little issues to go over.
You know, and that’s a whole big discussion of itself. Inside of religion people gravitate towards their own. So, you’ll have Pakistani people eating
dinner together, but they don’t really have any Arab friends over there, and
you’ll have Arab guys eating dinner but not really inviting the Pakistani guys.
You know, that’s just kind of the way we are in nature. We gravitate towards
people who look like ourselves and are from the same backgrounds, and have
the same conversations, and so even language differences… It’s not like they
are prejudiced against the other person, but they are more comfortable with
their own, right. But, the more you’re together, the more you break it down…
Yeah, it’s a lot to learn. I think the Muslim people - Muslim Americans, the
European Muslims - they’ve got a lot to do, because a lot of people have also
isolated themselves. You know, they socialize with each other.
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Aidan believes that the segregation of people on multiple levels occurs naturally. He
begins by discussing how some ethnic Muslim groups self-segregate within the
Muslim community. This example is used to discuss how the Muslim community in
general has become insulated from the outside world. Furthermore, Adan believes
that this social segregation needs to be overcome for non-Muslim Americans to have
contact with Americans. This contact is central to the alleviation of religious stigma.
Ali and Aidan place the responsibility of bridging this gap on the Muslim community.
Discussions involving the education of non-Muslims often centered on the activities
of religious structures. Religious structures provided environments, opportunities, and
guidance toward the management of stigma, as discussed in the next section.
RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES
Religious structures were discussed in tandem with positive stigma
management strategies that involved educating others. This section analyzes the role
of education and religious institutions in managing stigma. Religious education was
central to the way that participants understood their stigma and sought to alleviate
said stigma. Religious education in this study refers to the teaching that men received
at the mosque or related venues aimed at cultivating their personal body of religious
knowledge. Religious institutions refer to mosques, religious non-profit
organizations, churches, and interfaith organizations. Most of the men in this study
were familiar or participated in open-house events in mosques or working with nonprofit organizations aimed at teaching non-Muslims about Islam, and interfaith
dialogue and partnerships between mosques and other religious organizations. Men
discussed how their understanding of their religion lent itself to managing stigma
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engaging with dominant group members. Interviews and participant observation
revealed what appears to be a socialized process for stigma management. Participants
discussed how religious teachings and analysis of the life of the prophet Muhammad
guided how they came to manage stigma.
Religious Teachings
Religious institutions hold a unique role with respect to religious teachings
because they can be backstage spaces where religious instruction occurs. This study
found that some religious education directed participants toward certain stigma
management strategies. Aidan discusses the role that the religious community, which
he conflates with attendants at mosques and prayer services, plays in educating
others.
The community, I would say, because I’m not a scholar, and I know some
stories of the Quran and the teaching, but I don’t know everything - And
going to the mosques, going to the services, going to the prayers, meeting
other people, you hear these stories and then you get people to tell you more
practical terms, you know, what happened day to day with prophets along the
way: Moses, or Jesus, or Abraham, …. So, I think that those things are good,
because that’s not my area of expertise, you know. I am a physician. I am not
a religious scholar, but when you hear other people discussing, it kind of
brings it into reality a little bit…
Aidan believes that the religious community, mosques, and their functions are
important for Muslims because not everyone is able to be a religious scholar. By
receiving instruction from religious authorities, Aidan is able to understand his faith
and the life of the prophet more fully. Religious instruction from mosques and
religious centers come to carry a weight that informs how Muslim men respond to
mistreatment.
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Participants identify the experience of mistreatment as central to the history of
Islam. Many men shared the sentiment that Muslims had experienced alienation and
discrimination from the inception of the religion. Sermons incorporate experiences of
mistreatment from the life of the prophet Mohammad into teachings on moral
responses discrimination. Kareem, discusses these religious teachings:
They're definitely too numerous to name because, I don't know if you know
this, the history of the early community of Muslims, they started out as a tiny
minority surrounded by a really antagonistic majority. There were sanctions
against them, there were threats on their life. You don't have to be a really
deep philosopher to find direct parallels to being an oppressed minority
surrounded by people who are against you. It's really easy, the sayings and the
practices of the Prophet Muhammad. You could almost call it central to the
Islamic message. … The Imam of the mosque here at [site 3] and then other
prominent American Muslim leaders, they often quote particular examples
from the life of the Prophet Muhammad to explain to people what's the correct
way to respond to that kind of insult.
The discussion of these religious teachings is indicative of a socializing process
whereby participants are provided instruction on how to respond to stigmatization and
discrimination. An interpretation of Muslims as a historically oppressed group allows
for lines of relevance to be drawn between religious teachings and lived experiences.
Being a subordinate group surrounded by dominant group members is not viewed as
new to the Islamic faith. Furthermore, this interpretation and understanding of shared
suffering may contribute to the development of a salient ingroup identity. Participants
discussed how the prophet Muhammad responded to mistreatments in their analysis
of how they should and do respond to mistreatments. The interpretation of how the
prophet responded to mistreatment was provided by religious scholars and by leaders
at religious institutions. These interpretations were evident in the stigma managing
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actions of Muslim men. Red, focuses on more specific examples of mistreatment of
the Islamic community.
So, we’re taught things like that in those institutions, that whether it’s the
slandering of our prophet, or whether it’s laws and regulations banning hijabs
in France or something or whatever, or whether it’s a situation that Muslims
are being killed by the thousands in Syria. Whatever the situation is, we can
find a parallel of that or an example of that and we can look in our scriptures
of similar lessons on that, and we can look at the life of our prophet and see
how those are dealt with, and see what we are supposed to be doing about
them.
In this quote, Red discusses cartoon depictions of the prophet Muhammad, public
policy in France that bans the wearing of the hijab, and the mass execution of
Muslims in Syria. What is important with respect to this study is that Red ties what
are to be scripted responses to mistreatment and discrimination to religious teachings.
He uses the collective we throughout the quote. Red believes that the community of
Muslims should respond to mistreatment in the ways that sacred scriptures prescribe.
This interpretation of what scriptures mean come from religious leaders. Ali shares
Red’s belief and discusses the ways that the life of the prophet Muhammad informs
how he believes Muslims ought to manage stigma.
If you look at the way that he dealt with oppression, and backlash, and so on,
and so forth at that time it was a very turn the other cheek mentality. I won't
say full turn the other cheek but it was a patient approach and let's try to win
them over with kindness, and so on, and so forth. Plenty of those teachings
and in the Quran, it says be patient and combat the evil with that which is
better and things like that. That's how we have to deal with ... as minority
Muslims. We're not trying to take over the country, we're not trying to change
the system to Sharia law or anything like that.
Ali shares his understanding that the prophet Muhammad and religious teachings
prescribe responding to negative treatment with “what is better.” These teachings
appear to socialize a peaceful response to discrimination. Ali also discusses the

79

unique position that Muslims are in as a minority responding to negativity. He
combats potential stigma as anti-American by stating that in seeking equity for
American Muslims, they are not attempting to disrupt society. He uses the term
“Sharia law” which has become a very politicized term.
Men received religious instruction from locations outside of mosques. Some
of this outside religious education was described as directly relating to the
management of stigma. Zain eludes to commentary on name changing by religious
scholars here.
Muhammad is the most common name in Islam, and it’s the name of our- of
the last prophet in Islam, and um, so, like sometimes you’ll hear religious
scholars bring up that name and they’ll talk about how you’ve been given
such a beautiful name, why do you need to shorten it to Mo?
As previously mentioned in the Stigma Management section, Zain recalls discussions
from religious scholars that focus directly on specific strategies for stigma
management. These discussions question certain practices that conceal identity and
thus direct men away from religiously compromising practices. If conversations by
religious scholars occur on a large scale and influence the practices of Muslim men,
then they are indicative of a highly-socialized system of guiding stigma management
strategies.
It appears that ingroup religious education directs many practicing Muslim
men toward educational strategies for stigma management. These strategies are
viewed as mature and lend themselves to more static Muslim identities. Religious
institutions are also important because they provide spaces for Muslim men to
encounter dominant group members to engage in and practice stigma management
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strategies. The following sections will discuss the ways that religious institutions
created these spaces.
Mosques and Religious Centers
Mosques and religious centers were central to the management of stigma for
some men. They served as locations where interested parties could engage with Islam
on their own accord. Outsiders could also be invited into the mosque to engage in
interfaith dialogue about Islam. Furthermore, these locations served as hubs and
rallying points for social movements aimed at educationally managing stigma outside
of the mosques. In this way, mosques and religious centers functioned as “civil”
places, where stigmatized identities could engage with dominant group members and
“back” places, where stigmatized individuals can coordinate and discuss identities
without the presence of identity threat (Goffman 1963: 81).
Participants from site 2 and site 3 reported a heightened attendance by nonMuslims to the mosque following terror and political discourse by President Donald
Trump. Participant observation sessions at site 3 confirmed that non-Muslim guests
do attend religious services at mosques. In addition to myself, outside guests were
present at the 5 religious services observed. After executive orders were issued by
Donald Trump halting travel from several Muslim majority countries, a large group
of over 30 participants from a Unitarian church attended one mosque in a
demonstration of solidarity. Hassan, discusses this phenomenon:
I mentioned last year was - in my eight years - we had the most visitors last
year in 2016, and that's when the most rhetoric was going on. You know what
I mean?... a lot of times people have this misconception that we're trying to
turn everyone Muslim. It's rather just making people understand that our
religion is much more than what they see on television, or that's the worst
place to get their info about a faith, is from the news.
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Hassan discusses how the mosque that he works at has seen a surge in guest
attendance. He also stated, during a sermon, that he could not recall the last time that
they did not have guests at their religious service. Hassan believes this is important
because it allows for the religious Muslim community to combat stigma in a very
tangible way.
Visitors at religious services is viewed as a unique opportunity to manage
stigma. Site 3 has a formalized process for guests where they were requested to email
the Imam. This process allowed the Imam to offer to meet with individuals or to take
an Islam 101 class offered by the mosque. Certain rehearsals were present in every
religious service attended at site 3. The Imam greeted guests either in the masjid or at
the entrance of the mosque. Here, he generally thanked the guests personally for
attending the service. Typically, greetings included commentary on the timeliness of
their visit. This was typically followed by a quick layout of the service that they were
attending and direction to where the bathrooms were located. During the beginning of
the service, the Imam publicly thanked guests for attending and expressed gratitude
on behalf of the congregation. At the end of the service, congregants were invited to
thank guests personally for attending and many greeted guests with a handshake and
thanked guests for attending the service. These rehearsals attest to the high regard that
participants at religious institutions hold for these opportunities. Muslim men made
sure to have positive interactions with visitors to the mosque.
Interview participants also discussed hosting events, such as open-houses
where non-Muslims could listen to an expert discuss Islam and engage in dialogue
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with Muslims on site. Hamza, who is highly involved in interfaith work at his
mosque, discusses an open house that his mosque put on:
One of the example is the open-house that we conduct here. What is their
perspective? What is there something that need to be shared to the other
people about Islam? As you know, the media always throws always the
negative things… And really don't know about what. Because continuously
hearing this horrible stuffs they might have bad impression about this thing,
religion, or the Muslims. Just try to ... we did that ... with the mosque having
the group where we can call people and explain about Islam and know about
them. Like what their question is.
The purpose of the open house is to bring outsiders into the mosque and to cultivate
understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims. Some participants were critical of
the effectiveness of these events. The rationale behind the criticism is that attendants
would already be openminded people. Hamza discusses the importance of the openhouse event because it gives him an opportunity to discuss Islam with people that he
otherwise might not get to. He finds the open house events to be successful. These
events are central to how he combats negative images of Islam, which he attributes to
the media. Regardless of the effectiveness of these events, the fact is that these events
are central to how some individuals like Hamza negotiate and manage stigma.
Men shared that religious institutions and mosques served as locations where
Muslims could organize demonstrations aimed at denouncing terror or educating
outsiders. Mohammad, who is a religious leader in the community, discusses
community efforts to denounce terror.
Many things happen in this country within the last year. I have been invited to
go downtown [to site 3], where the marching area, 6th street, where the court
is. I went to [town name] to two different places, and where we gather around
and condemn whatever happened at that time. Whether, in our community or
another. So, I think our orientation is not to retaliate when we are shown
mistreatment, but to show good faith. To share with the community whatever
concern they have. By this way, we do believe mistreatment will go down.
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When you bring the [Islamic] community, and put them together with
American society. One guy who tried to kill some people- we went- the
[Religious Organization] and this Masjid and another, and we protested, ‘this
is not a good act.’ That brought many Americans - they really cannot believe
at all- there are Muslims against what happened, you know. So, that is the way
that we respond to the mistreatment. We have to go make a point, you know.
In this quote, community action is directed at providing education aimed at
condemning acts of terror. These efforts by the Islamic community are often
organized around mosques. Mohammad discusses a network of mosques and
religious institutions that organize protests and events in the Greensburg community.
Religiously practicing Muslim men can develop a unified front with a focused
approach to combatting stigma by using these back stage spaces to organize.
Not all participants believed that stigma management events organized or
hosted by mosques were effective. Ali discusses how a state fair booth organized by a
local mosque attempted to engage non-Muslims in dialogue with mixed results.
I guess, when we were at the fair we did encounter, we did have some good
discussions with some anti-Islamic people - or people, ‘Would you like a free
Quran,’ take it and throw it down on purpose, stuff like that. Those are some
things, the role the institution plays.
The booth at the fair was designed be a civil space. However, due to the
stigmatization of Muslims, many of the booth’s visitors were hostile to men working
the booth. Ali refers to individuals who respond negatively to stigma management as
“anti-Islamic” people reflecting dichotomy. Anti-Islamic people disrespected stigma
management efforts by throwing the Quran on the ground.
While mosques and religious centers were central to managing stigma through
education, they were not the only religious structures or even institutions involved in
stigma management. Non-profit organizations were utilized to manage stigma. The
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following section will focus on the role of non-profit and volunteer organizations in
the ways that participants manage stigma.
Non-Profit Organizations
When discussing religious involvement, some participants described the work
that they do in the volunteering and non-profit sector. Some of this work was aimed
specifically at educating non-Muslims about the true teaching of Islam. Zain shares
how he manages stigma through his involvement with a non-profit organization.
Um, for me personally, so I volunteer full-time for that organization,
[Organization Name]. So, whenever something like this happens, I think it just
gives us more of a reason to do more projects that promote compassion and
understanding. Our mission is compassion and understanding, so we just, you
know, any sort of negativity serves as fuel for us to combat it and put more
positivity into the world. So, that’s, I guess that’s how it affects me
personally.
Many of the participants were familiar with multiple non-profit organizations and
their connections with various religious institutions in the area. Zain directly ties his
involvement in non-profit work to the management of stigma. He states that when the
news covers terrorism attributed to Islam or when incidences of discrimination occur,
it drives him and those that he works with to further involvement. This non-profit is
directly aimed at combatting the negative stigma that surrounds Muslims. Zain
believes that by engaging collectively with this non-profit organization, his efforts
focused to create more tangible results. The non-profit is an example of organized
positive educational stigma management strategies. Its very existence is evidence that
Muslims are seeking out meaningful ways to combat stigma.
Participants in this study viewed volunteerism as a moral thing to do
regardless of stigma. However, general opportunities to volunteer were tied to the
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management of stigma by some participants. Mostafa shares how volunteering for
non-Muslims provides opportunity for positive exposure to Muslims that can be
useful in combatting stigma.
Our volunteer work doesn't specifically target Muslims, it's for everyone.
Honestly, we do more volunteer work for non-Muslims than Muslims. That
gets people exposed to us as well so it's a good chance for people to get
exposed to Muslims as well.
Mostafa asserts that the volunteer work that he is involved with isn’t exclusive to
Muslims. They do more volunteer work for dominant group members. This volunteer
work is important with respect to stigma management strategies because positive
exposure, such as altruistic work is believed to have the potential to change
perceptions of Muslim populations.
Interfaith Dialogue
Interfaith work was important to some participants who discussed positively
educating others as a form of stigma management. Formal interfaith opportunities
present a civil and safe space to offer educational stigma management. Aidan
discusses a prominent religious leader in the Greenburg community discussing terror
in an interfaith forum and the ensuing response.
Whereas, we have an interfaith thing. We have a very prominent guy in our
community and he gets up and kinda speaks. And one of the Jewish guys gets
up and says, ‘would you quit being an apologist? What are you apologizing
for? Nobody here in this town did it. None of your friends did it. Your family
members didn’t do this. Your religion doesn’t believe in this stuff.’
Interfaith organizations provided a safe space for Muslim men to discuss what they
understand to be true Islam because individuals in those organizations were typically
like-minded and shared goals with participants. When a leader in the Islamic
community spoke out condemning acts of terror, the response reflected that practicing
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Muslims had nothing to do with terror. This is important because it is in these
situations that Muslims are able to discuss their religion and experiences without fear
of the presence of stigma.
Several men reported being involved in interfaith dialogues at churches.
Interactions at churches were significant to this group of men because in the assumed
dichotomy between the Muslim world and the Western world the Western world was
Christian. Abraham, claims that he has been asked to speak on over 200 occasions
after 9/11 about Islam.
Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I told you- yeah, I told you 200 people- churches
called me and I spoke about what Islam is and yeah, I think that we are trying
to differentiate. The difference is, Islam is the same faith as Judaism and
Christianity. What do we call these religions? This framework- Abrahamic
religions, okay. And therefore, uh, I spoke about the importance of this
commonness, and that, uh- Oh, in one case- in one case the priest wanted me
to speak about our belief in Jesus.
The content of Abraham’s typical church discussions focused on the similarities
between Islam and other Abrahamic religions, though the focus is similarities to
Christianity. Discussing similarities serves as a vehicle to communicate that Islam is a
peaceful religion and close the Muslim-American dichotomy. Abraham asserts that
the differences between Christianity and Islam are smaller than what dominant group
members suspect in an effort to minimize stigma.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on interviews with religiously practicing Muslim men and participant
observation at religious services, this study explores masculine Muslim experiences
with racialization and stigma in Greensburg. The findings of this research are largely
consistent with the theoretical positions and findings of other studies of the
experiences of American Muslims. Men in this study hold racialized Muslim
identities in addition to racial, national, and religious identities that they already hold.
The process of racialization is evidenced by ambiguous racial designations that
Muslim men hold. Participants had difficulty racially classifying themselves, and
others. Furthermore, a historic understanding of the experiences of Muslim men
reveals the fluidity of racialization where in some instances they were casted as
honorary whites and in some instances, they were treated as subordinate group
members. These men, in turn, relied on making meanings from Muslim identities
above selecting conventional racial identities. These racialized Muslim identities take
prominence in the experiences of these men contingent on the existence of identifiers
that cause individuals to be associated with these racial categories. This study agrees
with other research that views the experiences of Muslim American’s through a
racialized lens (Rana 2011: 26).
Participants’ understandings of the differences in gendered Muslim
experiences of stigma are consistent with suggestions from previous research
literature. Men believed that they occupied a position of privilege in comparison to
Muslim women. This privilege was manifested most evidently in the amount of
discrimination perceived to be experienced. Discrepancies were attributed to the
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hijab: a visible symbol of Muslim identity (Selod 2014: 8). However, men also
discussed experiencing gendered stigma that casts them as sexist enemies of gender
equity and progress (Razack 2008: 16). Stigma of sexism appears to be unique to
Muslim men as opposed to Muslim women. This unique stigma of sexism is
important to the continuing research of Muslim men because it relates to intersecting
religious and gender identities. These experiences are worth studying because they
are not adequately discussed or analyzed by studying Muslims collectively or the
experiences of women. Future research and politics that seek to understand and
alleviate stigma must understand the impact of stigma on these intersecting identities.
Muslim men experience stigma and discrimination at an intersection of their
racialized, gendered, and religious identities. However, a variety of other factors
contribute to participants’ experiences. The stigma experiences of Muslim men
appear to vary primarily based on the visibility of their Muslim identities. Visibility
that made men susceptible to experiences of discrimination and stigma was
contingent on the prominence of stigma symbols; specifically: association with
Muslim women, association with Muslim men, names, dress/beards, accent, and
religious practice. While participants’ reports suggest that masculine identity symbols
are more transient than the hijab, men vary on how recognizably Muslim they are.
Men who appear or present themselves to be less visibly Muslim can pass to avoid
the consequences of stigma. Not all men shared this ability or desired to do so. Men
who were unable to or didn’t desire to pass appeared to be most interested in
educationally managing stigma. That is, they wanted to engage dominant group
members in ways that changed the ways that they viewed Muslim men.
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The stigmatization of Muslim men depicts them as opponents to the West and
democratic values. Analysis of Muslim experiences reveals a social dichotomy where
the dominant White American world and the subordinate Muslim world are
positioned against each other. In this dichotomy, Muslim men are suspect. This is
evident in the social interactions of Muslims. Despite most participants’ status as
American born citizens, interviewees were told to go back where they came from and
told to act more American. Other men recounted feeling pressured to defend their
faith by renouncing acts of terror. Still others reported being the subjects of
heightened surveillance. Religious identities and practice are thus juxtaposed against
national allegiance. The dichotomous American-Muslim relationship is also evident
in the current politicization of the Islamic faith, where even in the highest of
democratic elections, candidates cast Muslim Americans as suspect. Islam and its
alleged ties to terror lies at the heart of Muslim stigma.
If Muslim men occupy a social position where they are stigmatized as enemies
of the United States, subordinate group members are likely to engage in social
interactions in ways that attempt to minimize the consequences of their ascribed
stigma. Participants’ responses to stigmatization fit into categories of stigma
management previously developed in the research literature. These findings are
important to the study of Muslim men because 1) they represent conscious efforts to
control or perform identities, future studies of Muslim men should analyze
experiences from a perspective of stigma management. 2) They offer transferable
results and present an opportunity to expand the “race, nationality, or religion”
category of Goffman’s (1963) theory of stigma and stigma management, which as is
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remains underdeveloped. Muslim men managed stigma by withdrawing from social
relationships, concealing their religious or racial identities, and educating nonMuslims (Schroeder and Mowen 2014: 459). Participants’ seem to hold an
understanding of a social hierarchy of stigma management strategies. In this
hierarchy, men prioritize and hold educationally managing stigma in higher regard
than other forms of stigma management. Theoretically, this could be explained
because men in this study self-identify as religiously practicing. Therefore, religious
identity is likely more central to how they define themselves and thus must be
defended to avoid identity crises. However, more research would be necessary to
confirm this theory.
The withdrawal from social relationships was more subtle than other stigma
management strategies in interviews. Men discussed changing relationships and
social networks as a natural progression of life. However, some participants sought
out specific attributes and characteristics in the people that they did associate with. By
doing this, they avoided relationships with individuals who presented a threat to their
Muslim identities. This is significant to this research because if educational strategies
are desired by religiously practicing men, then social isolation can be detrimental to
meaningful stigma management.
Men typically described instances of Muslims hiding their identities in the
third person. That is, rather than discussing their own personal experiences,
participants often discussed how people that they knew concealed their Muslim
identities. Identity concealing stigma management strategies that participants
discussed include controlling public interactions, name changing, beard shaving, and
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control of religious practice. These strategies correlate directly with stigma symbols
that were linked to the visibility of Muslim men: association with visibly Muslim
women and men, Muslim sounding names, traditional beards, and religious practices
such as greetings or prayer. Furthermore, these men provided some social critique of
name changing and general identity concealing practices. Participants believed that
individuals who hid their Muslim identities sold out, or assimilated too much to
dominant group values and American culture. This points towards the educational
management of stigma as a strategy of choice for religiously practicing Muslim men.
Religious education seems to be a strong socializing agent in stigma
management among religiously practicing men. Participants provided scripted
responses to questions about stigma management strategies. This was most evident in
discussions about changing names to conceal stigmatizing identities where men used
a shared example of Mohamad changing his name to Mo. Interviewees cited
discussions from religious leaders and scholars as the basis for this example and their
viewpoints, which indicates that for these men there is some socializing agent or
process toward desired stigma management techniques. Men who managed stigma
educationally were secure in their Muslim identities. Many proudly presented these
identities and invited the discussions this presentation elicited from dominant group
members about their religion. These men felt religiously and morally obligated to
deflect the ways that their faith has been sullied.
Educational stigma management appears to be the strategy of choice for
religiously practicing men. This is consistent with Goffman’s (1963) original
discussion of stigma and stigma management. Men who sought to alleviate stigma by
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educational means unapologetically presented themselves as Muslim. This is like
stigma resistance (Poindexter and Shippy 2010: 376), as discussed in the literature
review. Stigma resistance represents “assertive, resilient choices to disclose”
stigmatizing identities (Poindexter and Shippy 2010: 377). These men viewed hateful
rhetoric as an opportunity to educate others. That is, the presence of hateful rhetoric
and discrimination provides a platform for men to discuss Islam on a larger and
deeper scale. Many participants reported an optimism that popular discussions that
center on hateful rhetoric and discrimination toward Muslims provides a unique stage
for positive stigma management strategies. These sentiments may not be shared
across a larger population of Muslims in other locations across the United States. Men
reported personal experiences of dialogues with dominant group members that began
because of the presentation of their Muslim identities. Men believed that relational
interactions and exposure to Muslims would be central to overcoming Muslim stigma.
This study finds that religious structures contribute to educational strategies
for stigma management by some religiously practicing Muslim men. The structures
discussed in this study include ingroup religious education, mosques and religious
centers, religious non-profit organizations, and interfaith work and dialogues. These
structures influenced stigma management by socializing toward scripted responses to
discrimination and stigma and providing civil spaces as avenues for men to manage
stigma. Participants reported that the interpretations of religious teaching that they
received lent themselves to peaceful, but unapologetic methods for stigma
management. They also reported that religious institutions provided programing and
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spaces where they could engage meaningfully with dominant group members in
efforts to educationally manage stigma.
IMPLICATIONS
This research provides a glance into the experiences of Muslim men amidst
racialization, stigmatization, and the generation of political fear against subordinate
groups in current time. Furthermore, it provides direction for future research and
insight useful for developing policies related to the human rights of Muslims. This
section begins by discussing the guidance that this project prescribes for future
research studies. Then it focuses on potential implications for the development of
policies that influence the experiences of Muslim men.
This study demonstrates that stigma and stigma management theories are
effective in unpacking the experiences of Muslim American men. Future studies of
Muslim populations in the United States should work from a framework of stigma
management. These studies should include studies of racialized men who marginally
or do not identify as religiously Muslim, women, and studies of how Muslims
navigate stigma in spaces with dominant group members such as schools or the
workplace. The following questions should guide this research: do stigma
management strategies differ between practicing Muslims and racialized nonreligious Muslims? How do women negotiate stigmatized identities given the salience
of the hijab as a stigma symbol? This research should be expanded to see if these
findings which are situated in these participants in Greensburg are indicative of larger
populations of Muslims in the United States.
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With respect to Stigma management as a theoretical framework itself,
Goffman (1963: 4) classifies stigma of race, nationality or religion as one of his three
primary forms of stigma. This form of stigma is especially relevant to the experiences
of Muslim men in the United States in the aftermath of terror and during the War on
Terror. Stigma management theories have been used extensively to discuss medical
conditions. However, research that focuses on race, nationality, and religion remains
under developed. Greater research attention needs to be paid to the stigma of race,
nationality, and religion and how these identities are negotiated and stigma is
managed. Furthermore “race, nationality, or religion” as a singular category will need
to be expanded and even dismantled to analyze the intersectional experiences of
racialized groups.
Future research on Muslim populations should take an intersectional approach
in analyzing experiences with discrimination and stigma. Men discussed the ways that
their experiences differed from those of the women in their lives. While this study
cannot project these assumptions to discuss the experiences of Muslim women, it can
suggest that further comparative and intersectional research be conducted.
Intersectional analyses of experiences have been important in social movements that
involve identity politics, i.e. the experiences of black women amidst the civil rights
movement (Crenshaw 1991). Identity politics are important because they allow for
subordinate groups to collectively fight for political voice. Continuing research must
continue to seek out differences in the experiences of differing identity groups within
the racialized Muslim category.
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This study is limited in that it does not unpack the dangerous nature of stigma.
Rather, this study focuses on how the presence and nature of stigma contributes to
strategies for coping with stigmatized identities. Stigma is dangerous to subordinate
groups because of its tendency to become internalized and disrupt identities.
Furthermore, stigmatization and hate rhetoric can cause individuals to be victims of
violence and discrimination as previous data suggests (Abu-Ras and Suarez 2009:
48). Research has found that positive individual and ethnic identities aid individuals
in dealing with discrimination (Romero, Edwards, Fryberg, and Orduña 2014). Future
studies should focus specifically on how positive religious identities or other
identities relatable to racialized Muslim identities contribute to the experiences and
negotiations of discrimination and stigma and vice versa. Muslim adolescents and
students who have grown up in the United States during the past 20 years will have
almost exclusively been exposed to a social-political climate that is hostile towards
their identities (Sirin and Fine 2007: 152). Future research should also focus on
generational differences in the experience of stigma and stigma management, as well
as how extensive exposure to stigma influence ingroup relations and the identity
development of subordinate group members.
This study also generates suggestions that should inform public and private
policies. Constructing Islam as the conceptual opponent to the United States is
advantageous to those who hold power in the United States political system.
Participants agree with research literature that acts conventionally defined as terror by
the American public and news media were committed by very specific demographics
(Rana 2011:55). Terror is predominantly limited to Muslim populations. Acts of
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violence designed to create fear by dominant group members is seldom called terror.
Rana (2011) argues that limiting definitions of terror creates avenues for politicians to
gain support from the public.
“Defining terrorism in this way made it advantageous to eliminate political
and social opposition, most often in the effort to quash leftist movements.
Using the language of counterinsurgency inherited from colonial military
strategies, terrorism was easily interchangeable with low-intensity conflict
and counter terrorism to propagate rationales for warfare and build
consensual support among the U.S. public (55).”
Discussing terror as exclusive to Islam has tangible effects on the lives of Muslims,
much like participants in this study. The mistreatment that men experienced was
typically rooted in the notion that Muslim men are opponents to Western-Democratic
interests. As long as treating Muslims as political opponents and superficial
Americans is advantageous for gaining political power, mass discrimination will
continue. Though it is easier said than done, American political groups must seek out
politicians and leaders that resist the use of a dichotomous understanding of America
and Islam to acquire political autonomy and power. Allies to the Islamic community
must find ways to use language that does not feed into a Muslim-American
dichotomy.
Public and private policy aimed at addressing discrimination against Muslims
should help to create and support safe spaces where educational stigma management
techniques can occur. Educational institutions, such as Universities, provide a unique
opportunity to socialize and educate students. College courses that focus on race
should incorporate the racialization and experience of Muslims into curriculum. If
exposure does contribute to tolerance and stigma, these efforts by educational
institutions should incorporate mosque visits and other immersive experiences into
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curriculum. Where possible, similar programs should be incorporated into schools
and into other public settings, such as the work place.
Interviews occurred prior to and directly following the election of President
Donald Trump, whose campaign and early presidency has been reviewed as decidedly
Islamophobic. Furthermore, western and international powers continue to create
legislation that polices and impacts the lives of Muslim citizens disproportionately.
Sadly, it appears that conditions for many Muslims in western nations will get worse
before they get better. Continuing research is necessary to unpack and understand the
experiences of Muslims in a social world where they have been stigmatized as threats
to freedom and democracy.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Introduction to Study:
Hello, and thank you so much for willing to be interviewed and helping me with my
research. During most of this interview I would like to invite you to do most of the
talking, so that I can learn from your experiences. We can keep the tone informal and
more like a conversation if you would like. My primary interest for this study is how
Muslim men experience mistreatment and then how they respond to it. Before we
begin, there are some important things that I want you to be aware of as we begin this
interview.
First, this research asks for about 1 hour of your time to conduct an interview that will
be audio-recorded and transcribed. During this study I will interview 20 individuals,
asking them similar questions.
Second, the records of this study will be kept private. There will be no information
included that will make it possible to identify you in any reports that are published.
Individuals in this study will be given a pseudonym to protect for confidentiality and
research recordings will be erased once they have been transcribed.
Finally, taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to back out of the
study at any time. Please keep your copy of the consent form and contact me if any
problems arise.
I would like to be very respectful of your time. Do you have any questions before we
begin the study? … Thank you again. Let’s begin.
Demographics
A. Tell me a little bit about yourself.
B. Guiding points
1. How old are you?
2. What do you do?
3. To the best of your knowledge, what is your family’s nationality of
origin?
4. To the best of your knowledge, how long have you/your family
lived in the United States?
5. To the best of your knowledge how long have you/ your family
been practicing Muslims?
6. What role does your faith play in your life?
Experience of Mistreatment/Stigma
A. Have you ever experienced mistreatment that you believe that you might
have faced due to your religious identity or perceived race?
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1. Can you describe this situation? / What happened?
2. How did you respond? / How did you want to respond?
3. Did you tell anyone? / Who did you tell? / Who didn’t you tell?
Why?
4. Do you think that these experiences are common? Why?
B. Do you know anyone who has experienced mistreatment that you/they
believe that they might have faced due to their religious identity or
perceived race?
1. Can you describe this situation? / What happened?
2. How did you respond? / How did you want to respond?
3. Did they tell you? / How did you respond? / What did you say to
them?
4. Are these experiences common? How do you know?
C. How has your life as a Muslim in the United States changed over the past
several decades?
1. How did life change for you after 9/11 in United States?
2. How did life change for you after more recent international
terrorist attacks attributed to ISIS?
D. Do you experience mistreatment directed towards Muslims differently
because you are a man? / How might your experience of mistreatment
differ from the mistreatment that women might face? / Why does this
difference occur?
Responses to Mistreatment
A. How have you had to change your life in response to changes in the
treatment of Muslims following terrorist attacks?
1. Can you give me examples of this?
2. Are there others?
B. How have people that you know had to change their lives in response to
changes in the treatment of Muslims following terrorist attacks?
1. Can you give me an example that demonstrates this?
2. Are there others?
C. Do you respond differently to mistreatment because you are a man? How
so? Why?
Religious Institutions
A. What role do the religious institutions that you attend play in how
you/those around you deal with mistreatments?
1. Can you give me an example that demonstrates this?
2. Are there others?
3. Are these helpful / hurtful?
B. What role does the religious community that you are involved in play in
how you/those around you deal with mistreatments?
1. Can you give me an example that demonstrates this?
2. Are there others?
3. Are these helpful / hurtful?
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C. Have you heard any teachings that have helped you in the midst of the
backlash toward the Muslim community following terrorist attacks? What
are these teachings?
1. Where did you hear them?
2. How were these teachings helpful?
Closing of Study:
Thank you so much for your willingness to take part in this study. That is all of the
questions that I had. Are there any points that you think that I might have missed out
on? Or any questions that I should consider asking respondents in the future? Are
there any questions that could be reworded or that you found to be particularly
troubling?
Alright, as I said earlier, my contact information is on your copy of the consent form
that you have. Please feel free to call me or email me if any concerns arise. Thank
you so much, have a great day.
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH CONSENT

CONSENT FORM
PROJECT TITLE:

Investigator:

American Muslim Men and Stigma: The Use of Religious
Communities as Mechanisms for Stigma Management
Derrick Brooms 118 Lutz Hall, Dept of Sociology
Jack Allen

113 Lutz Hall, Dept of Sociology

Univ of Louisville /
Louisville, KY 40292
Univ of Louisville /
Louisville, KY 40292

Introduction and Background Information
You are invited to participate in a research study about American Muslim Men and their experience of
stigma. Specific attention will be given to religious services and how those provide support in the
midst of stigma. This study is being conducted by Derrick Brooms, PhD and Jack Allen from the
Sociology department at the University of Louisville. Approximately 20 individuals will be invited to
participate.
Procedures
This research asks for about 1 hour of your time to conduct an interview with you using open-ended
questions. Your responses will be audio-recorded and transcribed. This study will also focus on the
structure of religious services and will analyze patterns in the preaching at those services. Total, this
project will seek to conduct 20 individual interviews and observe 20 religious services.
Risks and Benefits of Participating in the Study
The study is designed to learn about the experiences and views of people like you in general and not to
benefit you personally. All individually-identifiable information will be concealed and names
confidential, there are minimal risks to participation in the study. The information learned in this study
may be beneficial to others.
Confidentiality
The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report we might publish, we will not
include any information that will make it possible to identify a participant, unless the interviewee
explicitly demands such. In addition, other identifying information will also be changed in all
publications and presentations to further protect confidentiality. You have the right to retract any
information provided if determined necessary after the interview (for example, in the case of fear of
exposure, misinformation, or misrepresentation). Research records will be erased once they have been
transcribed.
Voluntary Nature of the Study
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be
in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you
stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.
Research Subject’s Rights, Questions, Concerns, and Complaints
If you have any concerns or complaints about the study or the study staff, you have three options.
You may contact Primary Investigator, Derrick Brooms at 502.852.8026.
If you have any questions about your rights as a study subject, questions, concerns or
complaints, you may call the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO) (502)
852-5188. You may discuss any questions about your rights as a subject, in secret, with
a member of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) or the HSPPO staff. The IRB is an
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independent committee composed of members of the University community, staff of the
institutions, as well as lay members of the community not connected with these
institutions. The IRB has reviewed this study.
If you want to speak to a person outside the University, you may call 1-877-852-1167. You
will be given the chance to talk about any questions, concerns or complaints in secret. This is
a 24 hour hot line answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville.
Statement of Consent
This paper tells you what will happen during the study if you choose to take part. Your signature
means that this study has been discussed with you, that your questions have been answered, and
that you will take part in the study. This informed consent document is not a contract. You are
not giving up any legal rights by signing this informed consent document. You will be given a
signed copy of this paper to keep for your records.
Participant Name (please print)
Signature of Participant

Date

Signature of Investigator

Date

List of Investigators
Derrick Brooms, PhD

(502) 852-8026

Jack Allen

(502) 507-2195
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